Section 1: Government Training Programs

In 1968, P. Bernard Nortman, Chief of the Newark Office of Economic Development under then-Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, noted that with the “exodus of affluent and middle classes in Newark there came an increasing flow of unskilled and poorly educated non-whites from the south into the city.” Subsidized by the federal government through discriminatory home loan programs and highway construction through Black neighborhoods, this white flight to the suburbs began in the 1950s and drained population, tax revenues, and jobs from cities across the country. In addition, many workers dependent on jobs in the manufacturing industry were displaced due to the changes of automation and technology occurring in the U.S. economy. However, as a result of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, manpower programs nationwide received nearly $50 million in financing by 1968 to address this problem. In particular, Newark’s Total Employment and Manpower (TEAM) neighborhood employment organization was operating under a $4.4 million federal grant and had processed 6,000 people to provide a variety of services, including manpower training.  Such aid was considered “keep them cool” money by the US Department of Labor in order to prevent “riots” in cities like Newark, which were considered to be “sensitive and high in racial tension.”

Despite these efforts, Newark was declared a “persistent unemployment area” by the federal government in 1971. This was no surprise to the new Gibson administration, since Nortman predicted in 1968 that 16,000 additional residents would be entering the workforce by 1975, in addition to the current unemployed and underemployed residents already in the city. He also noted that half the number of jobs needed to serve this growing labor force would be needed in the city, itself, and almost 25,000 additional jobs would need to be created outside of Newark to fill the expected job gap. Of his many recommendations to address this problem, Nortman highlighted the need for more training in business services; training for the expected jobs through the new Medical School; closer relationships between manpower authorities and the NY Port Authority; and more emphasis on preparing people for positions in government and non-profit sectors, identified as the “fastest growing sector in Newark.” 

To this end, TEAM’s Executive Director, Arthur S. Jones, noted in 1968 that in the first four months of operation, TEAM had placed “546 people in the private sector and 26 in the public sector of businesses.” By 1970, Jones reported that $2 million had been paid in wages and stipends to persons in training; and $400,000 was earned by persons who had found jobs through the program. Harry Wheeler, Director of Newark’s Manpower Training Office in 1971, stated that since its inception [TEAM] had trained 4,115 workers and placed 3,887 in jobs, which included clerical and machine shop positions.  

Annual Reports submitted by Mayor Gibson during the years of 1971-1973 reported that a total of 21,192 jobs had been provided under his administration.  However, according to scholar Willa Johnson, “… there [was] a huge force involved in training which [was also] being counted as employed.” She further claimed that job training under Mayor Gibson continued to focus on clerical, machinery, and other entry-level skills.  Johnson asserts that, based on the calculation method preferred by the N.J. Department of Labor & Industry, Newark’s total unemployment during that same period was reduced by less than 250 people, despite the 24,000 jobs reportedly created. By his own account in the Mayor’s Third Annual Report, Gibson reported that over 5,000 people were placed in “meaningful jobs,” yet over 20,000 people participated in pre-vocational orientation, on-the-job training, and training for entry level skills. Nortman cautioned against this type of training when he noted that “many manpower programs in Newark are repetitive and overlapping. Several train people in the same type of skill, often utilizing a slightly different label or job-title…duplication and lack of specific goals inherent in some of these programs siphon off much well-intentioned effort and good will.”

Based on the information noted above, there seems to have been no assessment of the type and availability of jobs accessible to Newark residents when Mayor Gibson took office. To be fair, every new mayor has to “hit the ground running” with what they have to work with in terms of available staff and funding, and perhaps this assessment task wasn’t possible at the time Mayor Gibson took office. Nonetheless, Newark was bustling with new employment opportunities at sites like the Airport and the Medical School during Gibson’s first term.  Nortman had noted that despite the increase in educational and skill requirements for these new jobs “the manpower training programs continue[d] to prepare trainees for less promising work…training resources [were] being used on many jobs which [were] primarily low-skilled…without due regard or the possibility that the jobs [would] not be available in the future or that the [existing] jobs [did] not offer chances for advancement.”

Nortman had laid out a number of recommendations for the Addonizio administration in 1968, such as “identifying prospective vacancies in various departments and setting  an explicit policy” to have these vacancies filled by residents who completed the appropriate training programs.  Unfortunately, as if history was destined to repeat itself during the Gibson administration, federal and state training money came from agencies that did not seem to take note of Nortman’s observations.  As a result, the Mayor’s efforts during his first term seemed to have little impact on the city’s unemployment problems.

In addition, when the federal government designated Newark as a “persistent unemployment area” in 1971, the city was entitled to increased federal and state aid totaling over $4 million. That same year, however, the state legislature created a Task Force on Urban Programs to oversee how Newark was spending these funds.  This Task Force charged Gibson’s administration with inefficiency, wasteful duplication and bad planning.  Although the Task Force acknowledged that the city needed “massive” aid, they warned it wouldn’t be given until reasonable assurances were given that the aid would be spent in an efficient manner. Later in 1974, despite boasting in his Second Annual Report that the city’s Manpower programs increased from $18.5 million to $30 million, the U.S. Department of Labor began extensive investigations into widespread abuses in Newark.  Allegations of abuse were considered “far worse in Newark than elsewhere” and the Department was considering a recommendation to cut off manpower training money.

In retrospect, there might have been little else Mayor Gibson could do but to accept the opportunities that were presented through the state and federal programs to create opportunities that were already familiar to the city. However, history has revealed that the lack of foresight from federal and state agencies limited the impact that the new administration would have on the new economy and eventually on black employment and job training in the city, as a whole.

References:

Willa C. Johnson, “Illusions of Power: Gibson’s Impact Upon Employment Conditions in Newark, 1970-1974,” PhD Diss., Rutgers University, 1978.

Bernard Nortman, “An Economic Blueprint for Newark,” Office of Economic Development, City of Newark, July 1968.

“U.S. approves TEAM extension through July 31,” Star Ledger, March 20, 1968

“4.5% Cut for Jobs – TEAM gets $3.85 million for 1971,” Star Ledger, November 3, 1970

“Newark qualifies for added job aid,” Star Ledger, July 11, 1971

“State Panel Says Newark is Being Run Inefficiently,” New York Times, November 13, 1971

“Possible Abuses in Job Training Scrutinized in Newark and Gary,” New York Times, December 10, 1974

City of Newark Second Annual Report, 1972.

Third Annual Report – Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson reports to the Citizens of Newark, 1973.