Chapter 7

PERVASIVE FEAR OF CRIME, 1970-78

A bitter, racially divisive run-off campaign of 1970 marked the election of Newark's first black mayor. Addonizio accused Gibson of being part of a "raw and violent conspiracy to turn this city over to LeRoi Jones and his extremist followers" (Newark Evening News 6/4/70) Addonizio proclaimed Gibson and Jones as a "dangerous pair of characters who will bring chacs to the Newark public school system, also to the urban renewal program and to the police department" (Newark Evening News 6/5/70) He called Gibson "one of the most radical individuals I have ever seen in politics...a wild desperate man." (Newark Evening News 6/10/70) Police Director Spina described the election as a "black versus white situation...This is no longer a political battle but a battle of survival." (Newark Evening News 6/8/70) One inflamatory prediction made by the deputy mayor was not repudiated by Addonizio until three weeks later, "[if Addonizio does not win] blood will run in the streets." (Newark Evening News "Mayor Disavows Perkins' Remark" 5/31/70) Toward the end of the campaign threats became more immediate.

In the last week the campaign turned particularly ugly. Addonizio supporters picketed the homes of Newark's two Congressional representatives to force them to endorse their man. Gibson announced that he had received bomb threats and asked for police protection. (New York Times 6/9/70, 30:3 and 6/10/70, 50:3) A black minister supporting Addonizio was the target of a shot gun blast at his home, which Gibson claimed as a hoax staged by Addonizio supporters in an attempt to discredit Gibson. In the same vein, Gibson also claimed that the young black men who threatened to break up some of Addonizio's campaign appearances were a "black goon squad" hired by

Addonizio. (New York Times 6/10/70, 50:3 and 6/11/70, 48:1) Rumors in the white community prophesied that a Gibson victory would result in rioting similar to 1967. Gibson warned that an Addonizio victory could leave the city in racial shambles. (New York Times 6/13/70, 33:5 and 6/14/70, 77:1)

Generally, Gibson tried to steer the campaign discussion away from racial issues while by his campaign actions he showed his intense concern for the black community. Gibson repeatedly stressed that he was not running to be a black mayor but a mayor of all the people. He kept pointing to the miserable city services and proclaiming that the city needed a new administration. Gibson tirelessly campaigned in black neighborhoods where his supporters had mounted an intensive and prolonged voter registration drive. The flavor of people's response to Gibson's campaign was captured by Douglas Eldridge, a reporter who had covered the civil rights movement for a decade. (Newark Evening News, 6/17/70, 11)

> [Before the election] he was already a hero to the city's black masses. Parents held up children to point out Gibson as he passed. Young men came out of taverns to take pictures of each other shaking hands with Gibson. And many hosts at house parties greeted him respectfully as "Mr. Mayor" or "Your Honor". Never in Newark's history had so many black people--especially young ones--banded together with white allies to work for a change within the political system.

Great enthusiasm poured forth at Gibson's election victory of 55,000 votes to Addonizio's 43,000. There was immense symbolic importance to this victory of black man over a corrupt regime. For black people, Newark government instantly became their government.

This symbolic satisfaction should not be discounted as any less powerful than material satisfactions. A central part of the black experience in America through the 1940s was that black men did not give orders to white men. Historically, segregation and occupations typically filled by black men gave them no opportunity to have white subordinates. When segregation was breached white people in traditional areas invented elaborate arrangements

by which white people would not be in positions to take orders directly from black people. In Newark most black residents were only one generation away from the South, where the tradition of black subordination was not greatly eroded before the 1960s.

Struggle to achieve black power was the response of a younger generation to the subordination of their parents and forefathers. In Newark the militants worked in uneasy alliance with the moderate Gibson after he surprised everyone in 1966 by a last minute campaign which captured 16,000 votes to Carlin's 18,000 and Addonizio's 45,000. His 1970 election victory was not due to white men giving the nod to their black man. It was due to the efforts of a Newark based movement led by black people who had grown up in Newark. First, in November 1969 a Black and Puerto Rican convention, at which white people had no vote, endorsed Gibson and nine black or Puerto Rican candidates for all City Council seats. Second, as the result of a registration drive the number of black voters greatly increased. Third, the support of Imamu Baraka eliminated the threat of a black candidate to the left of Gibson, and he far outdistanced the two other moderate black candidates in the seven-way general election. Fourth, Gibson concentrated his campaign in the black area even during the run-off and rejected advice to disown Baraka in order to attract white votes. As the result of this campaign Gibson won virtually all of the black and Puerto Rican votes and about 15% of the white votes. Thus, he became Mayor not beholden to the county Democratic party, organized crime, or any other white men.

Gibson took office in an atmosphere of enthusiastic belief by his supporters that his leadership would overcome the ills suffered most severely by the poor black people of Newark. The turmoil of city politics continued, but the anger was no longer vented on the Mayor. Both the City

Council meetings and the School Board meetings presented targets at which various racial and political groups directed their anger. Rarely did these meetings go smoothly, without the rise of tempers, shouting matches, uproar and confusion, despite the presence of police officers from the community relations unit (Newark Police Department, Annual Reports, 1970-74).

Crime Problems

We turn first to the crime problems which faced the new black administration during the 1970s. We then will take up fear of crime, which became so pronounced that it had far reaching consequences on economic and social life in the city. The following section will describe how these problems became issues forced upon the attention of the city government.

The upward trend of homicide from the 1960s continued into the 1970s, peaking in 1973 at 42 deaths per 100,000 people -- over four times as high as the national average of 9.3. Among the fifty largest American cities Newark's homicide rate was exceeded only by Atlanta, Detroit and Cleveland. Newark's homicide rate averaged 36 during 1970-78, far above the average rate of 20 set during the previous eight years. Most of these deaths took place between acquaintances who were black, and knives were the most common murder weapon. (Newark Police Department homicide summaries for 1974) This high number of murders between acquaintances continued to be regarded as private matters and the pattern as a fact of life. Elsewhere during the 1970s some police departments with the assistance of LEAA began to view homicides between family members as the final act in a long series of domestic disputes which were threatening to the safety of officers who intervene. The domestic crisis intervention program aimed at having police officers defuse immediate disputes and refer them to appropriate social agencies in order to

interrupt cycles of conflict leading toward serious injury. Police Director Redden judged early that such a program would be valuable in Newark but felt that he could not spare the manpower to provide the extensive required training. The fact was that all inservice training had been halted after the riots in order to avoid taking manpower from the street.

Muggings, armed robberies of stores, residential and commercial burglaries continued to occur frequently and to be regarded as serious problems which were within the power of police to ameliorate. It is not possible to identify whether the incidence of robbery and burglary became more frequent as the 1970s progressed or whether they reached a plateau and declined somewhat.

Arson became very frequent in Newark after the riots sparked by the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. Back in 1964 the fire department arson squad had investigated 520 fires and found 110 to be arson or started in suspicious circumstances. In 1969 the squad investigated 1,217, finding 804 to be arson or with suspicious circumstances. From 1964 through 1967 the number of reported fires in abandoned buildings had averaged 144 per year, then jumped to 436 in 1968, and reached a high of 1,135 in 1971. Table 7-1 shows the swift climb during the 1960s, the slowed climb during the early 1970s and the high plateau maintained during Gibson's second term of four different measures of fire problems. The table clearly shows how false alarms continued to rise as a proportion of total fire alarms. Sending false alarms via corner call boxes is a species of anti-social behavior particularly attractive to young boys.

Abandoned buildings were a favorite target for arson. Table 7-2 shows on an expanded scale the annual number of all fires in abandoned buildings and the total number of arsons and suspicious fires. For residents of decaying

Table 7-1

THE RISE OF FIRES IN NEWARK, 1948-1978



Source: Newark Fire Department, annual reports and arson squad summary sheet. Since the total number of alarms includes the number of false alarms, the number of fires is the distance between the top solid line and the dashed line.

Table 7-2

ARSON OR SUSPICIOUS FIRES AND FIRES IN ABANDONED BUILDINGS, 1948-78



Source: Newark Fire Department Annual reports and arson squad summary sheet.
In some years there was no report on the number of arsons.

neighborhoods the abandoned building next door poses a real threat that any fire there might also ignite one's own home.

By 1970 heroin addiction had reached epidemic proportions. In the absence of consist nt estimates of how many heroin addicts there were, and in the absence of a time series of the number of deaths due to heroin overdose, the isolated facts are that there were 42 reported deaths in 1971 due to heroin and other narcotics and 8 due to overdoses of barbituates. (Newark Evening News "Drug Toll Increasing in Essex", 4/18/72) Some notion of the magnitude of Newark's problem comes from a study in Boston finding that this city twice the size of Newark averaged 12 heroin deaths a year in the mid 1970s. (Krantz, et.al. 1979, 275)

Fear of Crime

Ever since the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967, fear of crime has been recognized as a problem separate from crime itself. A large survey conducted in Newark in 1972 showed that 50% of white residents and 64% of black residents felt unsafe or very unsafe when out alone at night in their own neighborhoods. A comparison with other cities is shown in Table 7-3.

The strong feeling of being very unsafe was held by 41% of black people interviewed while only 9% felt very safe. Black Newark residents felt less safe than black residents of the seven other cities that were studied. White residents of Newark did not feel as unsafe as black residents, and likewise felt less safe than white residents in any of the seven other cities studied.

An individual's sense of safety from criminal attack may be viewed as a balance between his estimation of the presence of attackers and his estimation of the presence of protection. People who do not feel safe when out at night refer to many dangerous people out on the streets. (Guyot, 1979) The high rates of predatory crimes committed in the black neighborhoods of Newark

Table 7-3

PERSONAL FEELING OF LACK OF SAFETY WHEN OUT ALONE IN OWN NEIGHBORHOOD AT NIGHT, 1972

Feeling	Newark Black Residents	Newark White Residents	Eight City Average for White Residents
Very Unsafe	41	26	20
Somewhat Unsafe	23	24	20
Reasonably Safe	27	35	39
Very Safe	9	15	21
Don't Know	0	1	1

Source: Garofalo, 1977, pp. 58, 252 and 253. The eight city average includes all eight cities which received High Impact Anti-Crime grants: Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Portland and St. Louis.

Garofalo, James (1977) Public Opinion About Crime: The Attitudes of Victims and Nonvictims in Selected Cities. Washington: LEAA, NCJISS.

form a basis in reality upon which such fears play. Further, in the early 1970s Newark suffered some bizarre and horrible crimes which could feed the fearful imagination.

People who feel safe remark on the presence of protection. In a survey of a small Eastern city, the most frequently mentioned source of protection was neighbors. (Guyot, 1979) In a three city study of public housing projects, a resident's estimate that neighbors would not intervene in suspicious circumstances or when a crime is being committed was correlated with his fear of being attacked and fear of his apartment being burglarized. (Newman, 1980) In Newark, however, many people do not believe their neighbors would help protect them. A survey of a cross section of Newark residents in 1977 found a range of feelings, from 58% of the residents who believed that neighbors would be very likely to call the police for a robbery in progress, down to 32% who expected calls for a suspicious stranger at night. (Guyot, 1977)

(Table 7-4 insert here.)

Fear has the power to empty a city's streets. Indeed, the streets of downtown Newark and all neighborhoods except Ironbound have been empty at dusk for the last decade. In the 1972 survey, 64% of the women and 45% of the men reported that they have limited or changed their activities in the past few years because of crime. (Garofalo, 1977, 258) These figures are about ten percentage points higher than the averages for the eight cities and thus do not convey the extensive and deep rooted fear of crime. Fear of crime has made some people change their habits so drastically that they are virtual prisoners in their homes. (Interviewer reports, 1977 survey) They have good reason to be afraid. Over one-fourth of the residents have witnessed a crime within the last year. In the Central Ward about 35% have watched while a crime was committed. Only about 10% of the watchers called the police and over half believed no one called the police. (Guyot, 1977, 5-6)

Table 7-4

CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN NEWARK RESIDENTS THINK THEIR NEIGHBORS WILL CALL THE POLICE, 1977

	Robbery at gun point	Breaking into an apartment or house	Kids smashing the window of a new car	Suspicious stranger at night
Very likely	58%	58%	40%	32%
Would intervene directly	0	0	5	1
Somewhat likely	24	24	28	23
Not likely	12	13	21	37
Don't Know	6	5	6	8
	100%	100%	100%	101%

n = 499

Source: Dorothy Guyot (1977) "Views of Newark Resident Before the Start of the Police Accountability Project." an interim report on the survey of attitudes toward police service. Newark: Rutgers School of Justice, mimeographed.

People who live in Newark adapt to living in fearful surroundings and cope with the danger and the fear. In the crime ridden Central and South Wards most of these fearful people are poor and black. The choice of moving out of Newark is not an open choice due to their poverty and discrimination in housing. Apparently for many people street crimes are a fact of life, rather than a problem which they demand be solved.

Suburbanites have also grown more fearful and changed their activities to avoid going into Newark. In 1972 the Federal Executive Board conducted a study to determine why the Newark regional offices were experiencing a critical shortage of secretaries and other employees. The study found cases of women who had accepted positions but found that their husbands or parents would not let them work in Newark. A common reply to recruitment quiries was "Yes, I'm interested in working for the federal government -- but not in Newark." Current employees were fearful to walk the few blocks to the train station. (Star Ledger 11/26/72, 28) The large insurance companies were experiencing the same problems in keeping a clerical and secretarial work force. Prudential, for instance, which had since 1945 been following a policy of decentralizing to regional offices across the country, began in the early 1970s to decentralize its headquarters functions to the suburbs. (Interview with a Prudential executive, 6/80)

Newark continued to lose population during the 1970s. Where the population had been 382,000 in 1970, the 1980 census shows slightly over 329,000, a drop of 13% from 1970. Fewer families moved into Newark than in the 1960s, and the exodus was propelled by an across the board decline in city services, white prejudice against living next to black neighbors and fear of crime. The weight of each of these factors has not been separately assessed. The focus of this study on crime problems should not be taken as evidence that crime was the major factor driving people out

of town. A study of race problems would probably effectively demonstrate that racial prejudice drove people out of town. A study of the decline in municipal services would likewise raise questions of why anyone with choices would remain in town.

Crime as an issue

After the national declaration of the war on crime in the 1960s, in many people's minds concern about rising crime was tied to an opposition to the advances which black people were making. Frank Furstenberg (1971) was the first researcher to recognize that surveys on public attitudes toward crime were tapping two different perceptions. In making a reanalysis of the 1969 Harris poll from Baltimore that appeared in Life Magazine (Rosenthal), Furstenburg separated out concern about crime as a social and political issue from perception of the risk of becoming a victim. Furstenburg showed that the two dimensions are unrelated, that a person's assessment of his risk has no influence on the importance he attaches to crime as an issue. He found risk related to the perceived character of the neighborhood and to neighborhood rates of reported crime. Concern about crime was positively correlated with opposition to racial change.

Similar findings come from a careful study in Portland. (Schneider, 1978) The people, white and black, who live in the neighborhoods with the highest reported crime rates do not name crime as one of their prime concerns. They name unemployment, poor housing, poor street repair and garbage service as their concerns. By contrast, people who live in relatively crime free areas, name crime as a high concern.

Two public opinion polls in Newark, just prior to the 1970 and the 1974 elections found that crime was the most important issue for white residents. In 1974 black people also named crime as the most important issue, a rise from 1970 when they viewed housing as the most pressing municipal problem. (Kimball, 48-49) The table below shows the strong degree by which police protection and crime

Table 7-5

PERCENTAGE OF NEWARK RESIDENTS IDENTIFYING MAJOR ISSUES FACING THE CITY, 1974

Issue	Black Residents	White Residents
Police protection and crime	27%	54%
Low income housing	25	8
Adequacy of welfare payments	21	14
Health care	14	8
Elementary education	11	18
Secondary education	8	14
Control of welfare payments	8	8
Recreation and parks	7	2
Fire protection	6	10
Street cleaning	6	6
Street maintenance	3	3
Garbage collection	3	3
Water and air pollution		
Don't know	17	19
Total	157%	174%

Source: Yatrakis (1980) citing the poll conducted for the Star Ledger by the Quayle Organization carried in the Star Ledger from 4/7 to 4/17/74.

were the most important problems for white people and how they were closely followed by housing and welfare for black people.

In the 1974 election campaign Imperiale seized upon the crime issue with more vigor than Gibson had in 1970. "I want to make sure that anyone can walk into the city and walk out safe." (Star Ledger, 1/17/74, 1:1) As the campaign drew toward a close, Imperiale became more vociferous.

> In reality, Newark ranks first in the entire United States in the rate of vicious crime, according to the latest figures compiled by the FBI. (Star Ledger, "Imperiale assails mayor on crime claims", 4/23/74)

Imperiale lost the campaign, but many voters agreed with him when he challenged Mayor Gibson's campaign slogan, "Continued Progress" with the remark, "You can't have 'continued progress' if you didn't have any progress to begin with." (Star Ledger, "Imperiale puts emphasis on city's 'survival'" 4/16/74)

Coping with Problems on Every Side

The context in which the city faced its crime problems has become more grim with the passing years as the trends which had been established in the 1950s and before continued their relentless downward course. The Gibson administration's efforts to cope with those problems are sketched here as background for a more detailed consideration of coping with crime.

The Long Honeymoon with the Voters

The turmoil, the rhetoric of impending disaster, came to an end. Black people expressed a great deal of good will toward Mayor Gibson giving him credit for being honest and well motivated. They did not demand quick results. A honeymoon period which is natural for any newly elected official, is naturally longer when an ethnic group has to fight against an entrenched system and great prejudice to get one of its members into the key leadership position. When he fails to exercise leadership, and the high hopes of the campaign are turned to dust, the natural reaction is apathy. Gus Heningburg, who was the co-leader of

Gibson's election campaign, reflected on Gibson's failure to make substantial improvements in the quality of life in Newark and on the larger dilemma of black people not holding a black mayor accountable. (Interview of Heningburg by Yatrakis 12/17/78)

> When blacks are elected to office, the people around them become paranoid to any challenge, any criticism, any attack. If another black comes along who is a serious candidate, capable of running, the attack they make on him is that he is disunifying blacks. He can't run on the issues. He has to run [against the accusation that] he is messing around and splitting the black vote, and then somebody white is going to get elected.

The honeymoon between Mayor Gibson and the black residents of Newark lasted through the 1974 and the 1978 campaigns. No black candidates of consequence ran against him either year. As a result, the voter turnout resumed its decline, from which the 1970 election had been an exception. While the decline in the 1950s and 60s had been only somewhat faster than the decline in population, the decline in the 1970s was much faster, as shown in Table 7-6.

At the beginning of his administration Gibson set up offices throughout the city to receive complaints and to help people in their problems of getting service from the municipal bureaucracy. These ACTION NOW offices funded under a federal grant did not have much effect on city services.

The major efforts by community groups to improve living conditions have taken place apart from the Mayor's office. Since the 1967 riots there have been four: a successful plan pushed by church groups for apprentices in the construction industry, called the Newark plan; an unsuccessful attempt by Imamu Baraka and his followers to build a housing and cultural center, Kawaida Towers, adjacent to the neighborhood of Anthony Imperiale; a successful rent strike by the tenant of the Stella Wright public housing project; and an unsuccessful attempt by church groups to establish a police accountability project.

Table 7-6

THE DECLINE IN TURNOUT FOR MAYORAL ELECTIONS

Election	Voter Registration	Voter Turnout	Percentage of Voting Age Actually Voting
1954 general		123	
1958 general		106	
1962 general	153	106	
1966 general	154	95	
1970 general	134	92	
1970 run-off	134	101	49%
1974 general	118	81	
1978 general	119	56	27%

Source: Computed from census estimates and voting records in the New Jersey Room of the Newark Public Library.

Number of voters is given in thousands.

Gibson's leadership style was to stay clear of issues and controversies wherever possible, not to commit the immense local prestige which he had on assuming office and the national prestige which he soon attained. Gibson was not publically criticized by any except Baraka for his failure to assist projects aimed at bettering the conditions of poor black people.

The first march on City Hall by black residents took place on August 15, 1973. In sharp contrast to the frequent marches of black people on City Hall during Addonizio's second term, the streets were quiet for more than two years. Councilman Dennis Westbrooks of the Central Ward led more than two hundred of his constituents in a march to City Hall to protest living conditions. To make their point dramatically some lugged bags of uncollected garbage with the intention of dumping them on the steps of City Hall. Officers were posted at City Hall to prevent the dumping. Fighting broke out between the demonstrators and the police officers. A black officer active in community relations was beaten by white officers. Afterward black leaders wanted to know why neither the Mayor nor the black Police Director was there to talk with the demonstrators. Gibson charged that Baraka was behind the demonstration for the purpose of embarrassing his administration. Baraka retorted with a threat of backing a different black candidate for Mayor. (New York Times 8/17/73, 35:3; 8/18/73, 55:1)

Mayor-Council Hostility

The City Council gave Gibson not one minute's honeymoon. The Council unanimously refused to confirm his appointment of John Redden, a deputy chief, as Police Director. The three black councilmen wanted a black Police Director and the white councilmen were aligned with the PBA in their opposition to Redden. Mayor Gibson faced them down by threatening to tell the huge crowd that was at the moment gathered for his inauguration. The Council buckled, and approved Redden by a 7 to 2 vote. (Curvin, 1975, 111 and an interview with a top police administrator, 9/12/80) Gibson has had difficulty with his City Council during

all three terms, but his problems were most pronounced during his first term. Gibson's troubles were similar to Carlin's. Like him, Gibson did not consult with the Council and tried to keep to a minimum the information he gave them. The Council accumulated quite a backlog of unanswered written queries to the mayor. On the rarest occasions when he badly needed some legislation he met informally with Council members.

Gibson also consistantly made his own decisions on non-civil service appointments, much to the chagrin of councilmen, who want to share in the patronage. Important differences in this regard between Carlin and Gibson are that Gibson used his power of appointment to build a basis of electoral support and he had much greater resources in the flow of federal funds. Gibson channeled all federal funds through the Mayor's Policy and Development Office, thus shielding thousands of positions from any influence of the Council. He had retained Donald Malafronte, Addonizio's top administrator for intergovernmental affairs, to develop the manpower office against the bitter complaints of black advisers who wanted nothing to do with the old regime.

Gibson also set up the Kenneth A. Gibson civic society, a fund raising organization modeled on those from the days of Commission Government. Department heads were expected to sell picnic and banquet tickets to their employees. Thus, Gibson had vastly more electoral resources than the councilmen, which fed their hostility. Often a majority of the Council united across racial lines against Gibson.

Racial considerations influenced the Council handling of many issues during Gibson's first term. Even the struggle to raise taxes became a racial

issue between Italians and blacks. Since Gibson had proposed the taxes on business, white owners of small businesses charged that he was trying to drive them out of town. (Curvin, 9/79) With six white councilmen, Gibson faced an automatic opposition that particular efforts could overcome. One factor which somewhat blurred the racial cleavages in the Council was the fact that five council members had constituencies which had about equal numbers of black and white voters. They were the four members elected at large, only one of whom was black, and the representative from the West Ward. (Gwyn, 1974, 24-25) When Gibson ran for re-election, like Carlin, he did not form a slate of supportive councilmen and thus when black members were elected, Gibson could not count on their support. Finally in 1978, the proportions of black and white council members reached 5 to 4 and thus fairly closely reflected the black and white division of the city.

Gibson's Administration

Observers of Newark politics agree that Mayor Gibson is a pragmatic leader who lives one day at a time. His engineering background shows in the methodical way he analyzes problems as though when he thinks of a bridge he must think of every little part. Robert Curvin, who organized the Black and Puerto Rican Convention and then coordinated Gibson's election campaign, recounts this conversation.

> A few days after Gibson was elected in 1970 we were just talking about what we thought was going to happen. I asked Elton Hill... a guy he grew up with, one of his best buddies,..."What do you think Gibson really wants to do more than anything? What do you think is his major objective? What would he like to accomplish that would leave his mark on Newark?" He said, "Well, Ken really would like to build a new city hall." (Curvin Interview 9/79)

Gibson's experiences in his first years in office further strengthened his passive approach. He reacted to crises rather than leading in bold directions. Not only did the mood of the City Council fluctuate from reluctant to intensely hostile, Gibson also faced a number of overwhelming problems

which exploded into crises: the fiscal plight included a hidden deficit of up to $60,000,000; the deteriorating school system suffered a three month teachers' strike; the Kawaida Towers project became a racial struggle.

Gibson inherited a city administration less efficient then Addonizio had found it. Since the pool of executives who are skilled in municipal administration is heavily populated by white men, so Gibson's first cabinet of seven were white men, with the exception of his corporation counsel. Gibson particularly disappointed his followers by not appointing a black man as his Police Director. Gibson then recruited several department heads through a national search, obtaining some highly skilled administrators and specialists in their fields. The individuals recruited nationally were generally frustrated with the way the city conducted business and did not stay more than a few years. The business administrator left with a public blast at the Gibson administration. Gradually, by 1978 when Gibson began his third term most of his agency heads were black and from Newark. Observers of Newark politics see a pattern of Gibson's unwillingness to recruit and retain capable black administrators. Since the Mayor did not prod his department heads, lethargy prevailed except in rare pockets where a forceful administrator shaped his staff. When Gibson had been in office a little over a year the state task force on urban programs charged in its report that his administration was riddled with inefficiency, no show jobs, wasteful duplication, bad planning and a lack of leadership at every level.NYT11/13/71, 1:2)

Financial Woes

Fiscal problems influenced all other problems of municipal government. When Gibson arrived in the mayor's office, he found that Addonizio had pulled a number of tricks in order to avoid raising taxes in an election year. He

had hidden $21 million in school operating costs and the debt projected for the end of 1971 was $60,000,000. (New York Times, 9/20/70, 1 and Curvin, 9/79) Since both Trenton and Washington were under Republican administrations, Gibson did not get the assistance he needed. The state legislature, dominated by suburban counties did not appropriate funds, but did pass legislation permitting Newark to levy some minor new taxes. These stop-gap measures were not sufficient and so at the Mayor's request the City Council raised the property tax rate. The major change from 1967 was the rapid increase in the city's dependence upon state and federal governments. Chart 7-7 shows how these revenues grew from 5% of the city's budget to 48% in 1974. Since the city did not control the ebb and flow of these funds, the Mayor took a calculated risk in expanding the city payrolls while simultaneously reducing the property tax prior to the 1974 election. In 1975 the cutbacks in state and federal revenues rocked the city. Its major response was to layoff civil servants. Again in 1976 and again in 1978 the city was forced to layoff personnel. The sequence of layoffs in the police department had a devastating effect on the department's ability to perform.

Deterioration in Many Aspects of Life

The economic life of the city which had not been healthy since the 1920s, declined sharply in the 1970s. Manufacturing and service industries continued to move out of Newark, the labor force continued to shrink, and the numbers grew of young men who were neither at school nor at work. While Gibson immediately established a cordial relationship with the downtown business community, his administration did not make a concerted effort to attract new firms to the city or to prevent established ones from moving.

Chart 7-7

DEPENDENCY ON FEDERAL AND STATE AID

IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT DOLLARS

1978 = 100



Source: New Jersey, Division of Local Government Services, Annual Reports. The state has produced a consist nt time series which is calculated differently from the Census Bureau's figures.

The actual dollar expenditures are converted into 1978 dollars in order to eliminate effects of inflation.

Table 7-8 below showing unemployment underestimates the number of people out of work since the definition requires that the individual be actively looking for work. Many thousands of Newark residents have given up looking for work. Note that the city's rate of unemployment is consistantly higher than the county's. They both peaked in 1975 and 1976, years of a national recession.

Children attending Newark schools were performing two years below grade level in 1970. In 1971 the city suffered the longest strike of public school teachers thus far in U.S. history. The issues were the typical bargaining issues but many different community groups including Baraka's involved themselves in order to break the union which they saw as a white power block despite the president's being black. The strike and the bizarre negotiations continued eleven full weeks. During the strike a group of teachers were waylaid and severely beaten, but none of the attackers were ever identified. In the end, the union and the board settled for a renewal of the old contract but great damage had been done to relations between the teachers and the community. (Curvin, 1979) By 1978 the performance of Newark school children was no better, two years or more below grade level. It was considered a fact of life that Newark high school graduates had not learned how to read and write well enough to hold down clerical jobs. (Interviews with a Prudential executive 6/80 and with two long time residents, 1/16/80.)

Neglect of the Puerto Rican Community

In 1970 the Puerto Ricans who composed seven percent of the city's population were generally poorer than the black people. The nomination of Gibson by the Black and Puerto Rican convention raised great hopes among Puerto Ricans as well as among black people. Gibson's appointment of a

Table 7-8

PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN LABOR FORCES OF NEWARK AND ESSEX COUNTY DURING THE 1970s

Division of Planning and Research, Office of Labor Statistics

	Newark	Essex County
1970	8.4	5.7
1971	10.4	7.2
1972	10.6	7.3
1973	10.3	7.1
1974	11.6	8.0
1975	18.0	12.7
1976	18.2	12.8
1977	15.9	11.1
1978	12.1	8.4
1979	11.7	8.1
1980	13.9	9.7

Source: New Jersey Office of Labor Statistics, Division of Planning and Research

The figures for 1970 - 79 are annual averages. The 1980 figure is preliminary for July.

Puerto Rican as deputy mayor focused hopes, but his appointment was a token. Specific hopes for city employment, for better housing, for Spanish language services, were all dashed. The deep disappointment which grew over the years was expressed in 1974 by a Rutgers law school professor, Jose Rivera. He pointed to the similarity of the position of black people under Addonizio's administration to the position of Puerto Ricans under Gibson. (Human Rights Commission, 1976, 17)

The Worst American City

In January 1975 Newark received this title from an associate editor of Fortune writing in Harper's. (Louis, 1975) The article concluded,

> The city of Newark stands without serious challenge as the worst of all [fifty large cities]. It ranked among the five worst cities in no fewer than nineteen of the twenty-four categories, and it was dead last in nine of them. Adding one, two or even three tables couldn't possibly jar Newark from last place and there is every reason to suppose that more comparisons would simply bury it deeper. Newark is a city that desparately needs help.

While social scientists differ on value of adding up arbitrarily selected indicators in order to arrive at a composite index of the quality of life, the article's conclusions confirmed nationally the image problem which Newark had long suffered locally. Such a simplification of reality misses the commitment which many people have to their city. Their efforts have created and maintained islands of excellence and beauty. The relationship between Newark's image as the worst American city and the reality of physical and social deterioration is similar to the relationship between fear of crime and the specific crime problems which people of Newark suffer. Both images have a strong basis in reality, and both emphasize only the bleak aspects of life and both make more difficult the tasks of transforming the bleakness.

Accomplishments of Gibson's Administrations

Given the overwhelming problems which Newark faced, Gibson did make some substantial accomplishments for the city. First, he kept racial tensions from breaking out into rioting on the scale experienced in 1967 and 1968. He was firmly committed to the rights of all factions to express their views freely. He personally built bridges between the black community and the downtown business community. His own moderate tone did much to moderate the strife which had built during the 1960s.

Second, he obtained a remarkable amount of federal money and state money. Without such massive subsidies, Newark would have been bankrupt in 1971.

Third, he greatly increased the number of black people employed by city government. Gibson supporters had looked at government jobs as an aspect of representative government and as benefits bestowed. Since black people had systematically been excluded from power the Gibson appointments at high levels and for routine jobs increased the degree that the ethnic composition of the government reflected the ethnic composition of the city. In this matter his actions were in the pattern set by Commission Government and revived by Addonizio, patronage distributed among one's ethnic group.

Fourth, under the Gibson administration deterioration stopped on some measures of quality of life. In the health field the city made the most progress. The statistics on infant mortality, fell somewhat from their rates which were three times the national average.

To achieve any of these improvements, Gibson needed and accepted millions in federal aid. His administration's efforts to make a dent in the crime problem, likewise relied heavily on federal funds.

Washington's Initiative: The Impact Program

Having sketched the nature of the crime problems facing the city during the 1970s and the host of other problems which competed for attention, we turn now to the responses. In this period the new source of funds and ideas was the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration created in 1968 which will be discussed first. Afterwards we will mention state programs and then responses carried out primarily through the police department. To achieve dramatic reductions in street crime, in January 1972 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration committed $20,000,000 each to eight cities through the High Impact Anti-Crime Program. Recall that Nixon had campaigned in 1968 on a law and order platform. The Impact program was a demonstration of his administration's commitment in the "war on crime". Twenty million to spend in two years was a huge sum for Newark. In 1971 the city had spent $21,000,000 for police and the county had spent $6,500,000 for jails. The city developed 27 projects through which the police department spent 55% of the funds, seven community groups in Newark shared 17%, other city agencies spent 7%, the Impact planning unit spent 6%. All the county and state agencies shared 14% of the funds. In 1975 when a national consulting firm evaluated the Impact program, it found that none of Newark's projects had yet been demonstrated effective. (Chelimsky, 1976, 322-323) By 1978 when the last of the federal funding was gone, many of the projects had also disappeared. The reasons for the failures in Newark lie in fundamental mismatch between the Impact program and Newark's needs.

The Impact program in Newark is an example of ineffective policies as the result of the confluence approach to decision making in which the stream of solutions dominated the stream of problems. That is, the solution which LEAA was willing to fund did not fit Newark's problems. After a struggle, Newark

accepted the funds on LEAA's terms. The analysis below focuses on how the solutions dominated the definition of the problems. Political considerations also entered into the decision making at all five levels of government involved here: Washington, the LEAA regional office located in New York, Trenton, Essex County, and Newark. On balance, the influence of politics on decision making further twisted the solutions away from a good fit with Newark's problems for reasons outlined in chapter 1. While little of the political tussling will be discussed below, we may note that the primary way in which political considerations influenced decisions was to favor short term dramatic projects over the long term upgrading of performance. The preference of every political unit for short term impact was counterproductive in dealing with the long term crime problems.

Initially Mayor Gibson and other city and state officials believed that the Impact program was a form of revenue-sharing. Gibson was quoted in an LEAA publication, 'For the first time, the City of Newark will be able to decide What its needs are to fight crime without worrying if those needs fit into some specific federal guidelines". (Jordan, 11) The Nixon Administration had been discussing its relations with state and local governments as the "new federalism", a partnership in which Washington no longer imposed blanket directives. Thus, initially, there appeared to be a smooth confluence between Washington's decision to assist selected cities to reduce street crimes and Newark's needs to reduce street crimes and to obtain funds. The requirements did not initially appear onerous, that the money be spent in conformance with federal auditing standards and within two years. Each city would set up an Impact office to draft the city's plan detailing the projects to be funded, the plan would be approved by LEAA, the city would provide 20% matching funds, local agencies would carry out the projects and the local Impact office would evaluate them. Even the six stated national objectives appeared to be general enough to accommodate almost any local effort against crime.

1. to reduce the incidence of five serious crimes by 5% in two years and

by 20% in five years: the murders, rapes, robberies aggravated assaults, and burglaries which are committed by strangers.

2. to demonstrate an integrated process of planning, implementation and evaluation.
3. to acquire new knowledge about innovative programs.
4. to improve agency coordination and increase public involvement.
5. to institutionalize effective programs in the eight Impact cities.
6. to disseminate the new knowledge beyond the eight cities. (Chelimsky, 1976, 25-26)

The foolishness of using the numbers of crime incidents which appear in the Uniform Crime Reports as a measure of project success has been discussed in chapter 1. When the man who designed the Impact program, Martin Danziger, was later asked the basis for the goals of 5% and 20% crime reduction, he replied, "I just made them up. It sounded good." (Vorenberg, 1976)

. As a whole, LEAA's definition of the solution resulted in projects which were ill suited to Newark's needs. For LEAA, the first three objectives on the list were most important: projects must directly aim at reducing target crimes, all projects must undergo elaborate evaluation, and projects should be innovative. The national objectives coupled with the requirement that Newark spend the funds quickly, worked against effective or lasting solutions. By three different authoritative definitions of needs, the criminal justice agencies', the Mayor's and the Police Director's, the twenty million dollars were ill-spent.

During the first three months of the Impact program representatives of city and county operating agencies formed five task forces to assess their needs. The report identified inadequacies over a broad range, including police information,

manpower allocation, and facilities, case screening and preparation, pretrial intervention, defense services, court processing, juvehile services, corrections facilities, and drug programs. (Jordan, 14-16) Most of these problems and needs were never addressed by the Impact program. The solutions to these problems required standard upgrading and could not pinpoint results in bringing down the rates of target crimes. Even the information collected by the task forces was little used by the Impact planning unit. (Jordan, 24)

Mayor Gibson set community involvement as the city's major approach to reducing crime when he selected Earl Phillips as the program director. Phillips, was a 38 year old black man who was President of the Essex County Urban League. He had been active for close to a decade in community relations work including police-community relations. Phillips had been Gibson's first choice for an entirely different new position of Newark Ombudsman, but when the City Council seemed unlikely to pass the enabling legislation, Gibson persuaded Phillips to head the Impact program. (Gwyn, 1974, 19-31 and Jordan, 1975, 19-20) Thus, the new director had had no experience in the criminal justice field nor in any government agency. He hired his staff without consulting with the criminal justice agencies. His plan dealt with the social causes of crime, proposing to spend $36,000,000 of which $12 million would be spent by community groups. (Jordan, 37-40) Only in 1977 did LEAA recognize the value of community crime prevention.

The political benefits of community involvement were not lost upon the Mayor. Gibson greatly increased city hiring during 1972 and 1973 particularly in non-civil service patronage positions. (Yatrakis) The $12,000,000 Phillips planned to spend through community groups would produce 1,500 jobs by the conservative estimate that 75% of the funds were for wages averaging $6,000 per year (the rate at which housing guards were hired). These jobs could, of course, be filled without civil service restrictions. However, Phillips' approach to community involvement did not satisfy a major group of black

ministers headed by one who was the first black councilman not beholden to white political leaders. Phillips had not responded to their plan for linking church based citizens groups to the police precinct stations. The ministers charged that Phillips worked with only a small segment of the community. (Star Ledger, "Black Ministers Assail Phillips", 12/1/72)

It appears that the importance of churches as social centers in black neighborhoods of Newark required their involvement for an effective community crime reduction program. Given the great antipathy which had developed between many black people and many policemen, a church based effort to cooperate with the police was a sound idea, whatever the problems with the specifics.

Police Director Redden saw different priorities for coping with Newark's crime problems. He advocated basic management upgrading of the criminal justice agencies. (Interview with a top police administrator, 9/12/80) However, in the early 1970s LEAA's touchstone was the innovative program. Redden considered innovative programs to be frills when the agencies lacked the essentials of sound management. Specifically, Redden looked at the kind of upgrading which had long been beyond the financial reach of the city -- a centralized police facility. Director Redden had inherited a dilapidated and decentralized physical plant. A 1942 study had criticized police headquarters as antiquated. (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1942, 142) By 1972 the same building still served as headquarters, supplemented by all or part of four other buildings for central functions and four precinct stations. The particular problems stemming from the physical plant which most concerned Redden were the inhuman jail conditions, the officer frustration from working in terrible facilities which he then was likely to vent upon citizens, and the inefficiency of separation into many buildings.

From the perspective of this study, the most damaging aspect of the Impact program was the insistance upon haste. The governmental ineptitude and corruption chronicled in the earlier chapters leads to a recommendation for any funding agency to proceed deliberately and with full public discussions. Unfortunately, public discussion was less informed after the Newark Evening News had folded due to a protracted strike in 1971. Since then the city has had only one daily newspaper, unstimulated by competition to ferret out mismanagement in City Hall. Specifically, hasty solutions for crime problems are inappropriate since the interlocking factors which have promoted crime are too complex and too little understood to yield when millions of dollars are thrown at them. The rise of crime rates in Newark to levels far above the national average had taken place slowly since the early 1950s. If Newark's crime problems are substantially reduced, the process will likewise take place slowly.

The haste served political needs to "do something about crime" before the next election. The Nixon Administration decision for a dramatic impact was announced with some fanfare in January 1972 by Vice President Agnew and Attorney General Mitchell. (Chelimsky, 19) Since LEAA had not been established as a permanent agency, but merely with a five-year authorization, the personnel of the agency were more oriented to short-term programs and quick results than they otherwise would have been. The two-year life of the Impact program also fit the Gibson timetable since he faced an election in May 1974.

The unfortunate aspects of haste were that programs and personnel were tacked on to unchanged agencies and that once the funding dried up the programs withered and the personnel were shed. At least, haste did not promote graft, prevented by the tight fiscal auditing system LEAA had established through the regional offices and the state planning agencies.

Given the condition that Newark had two years to spend the $20,000,000, probably the most benefit would have been gained by building a single, central

police facility. Director Redden's condemnation is correct, the buildings as they stand today punished prisoners, inflicted hardship on department members, and compound inefficient management. In the 1960s all buildings used by criminal justice agencies in Essex County had been woefully inadequate. In 1971 the county replaced the antiquated jail and overcrowded county courthouse. The city could have renovated one of the large office buildings which businesses moving out of town were ready to donate as a tax loss. For a larger investment, the city could have built a new building across from the county courthouse on land already cleared by urban renewal.

Two other federal conditions completely barred the building of a police facility. A new police station was not aimed at reducing any of the target crimes, and it certainly was not innovative. A city with well-managed agencies which had good research and development staffs could come up with sound, crime-specific programs, which might indeed use resources in a new way. In retrospect, the LEAA evaluation found one of Newark's twenty-seven programs was innovative, a rape investigation unit housed in the police department. (Chelimsky, 298) By contrast, Denver had seven innovative programs.

The other LEAA condition which diminished the liklihood that Newark projects would have long-term impact was the requirement of comprehensive planning and evaluation. Since planning is not usually the enemy of endurance, an explanation is in order. As an agency, LEAA has put a high proportion of its funds into planning and evaluation. In addition to the regional offices common to federal agencies, LEAA funded the creation of fifty state planning agencies which were to monitor the flow of federal funds. LEAA even paid for the establishment of county and city criminal justice planning agencies. None of these planning agencies were housed within police departments, courts, etc., but were detached units which planned for the spending of LEAA funds. Since a maxim of American politics is "He who pays the piper calls the tune", local

agencies dutifully received help from their local planners in drafting the plans and the evaluations of their projects to spend LEAA funds. Criminal justice agencies continued to be unfamiliar with management information systems and uncomfortable with comprehensive planning and evaluation.

The grand scale of the Impact program was matched by the complexity of the planning and evaluation which cities had to perform. In keeping with LEAA precedents, the Impact program was planned by a unit that was outside the operating criminal justice agencies. The Impact office had to follow an elaborate seven-step planning and evaluation model for every project. Evaluating the effect of programs in reducing the incidence of crimes is especially difficult due to the many factors which affect crime rates and to the imprecision of recorded crimes as a measure of crime incidents.

Newark spent over one million dollars of the grant on the Impact office. The planners had no relationships with the operating agencies other than to impose on them for data. Thus, none of their skills in planning or evaluation were applied to projects outside of those funded or to the tasks of integrating the projects into ongoing operations. Although the planning unit survived past the end of the Impact funding, the reduced staff lost interest in even following the course of the few projects which survived. A less ambitious evaluation program could have been carried out by one career employee in each of the major operating agencies. Thus, planning and evaluating at least, could have served the long-term concerns of the criminal justice agencies.

We turn now from what might have been, if the national Impact program had been congruent with Newark's needs, to an analysis of how the program actually operated. Table 7-9 lists the twenty-seven projects grouped according to the implementing agencies. Note the wide range of projects in sponsorship, aims and size. Newark's fourth Impact program Director summarized the city's experience in an exceptionally frank interview as a demonstration of "what not

Table 5-7

IMPACT PROJECTS IN NEWARK, 1972-1977

Implementing Agency	Project	Impact Funding as of 1975 in $'000	Status as of 1981
ark Police Dept.	Communications System	$2,970	Continues, diminished
	Public Housing	2,056	Continued to 1979, LEAA & S
	Tactical Anticrime Team	1,899	Continues, diminished
	Team Policing	1,583	Ended
	Auxiliary Police	746	Ended
	Crime Laboratory	483	Not started
	Rape Unit	282	Continues, diminished
	Property Identification	27]	Continues, diminished
	Block Watches	23]	LEAA Community, Anti-Crim Grant
unty Courts	Special Case Processing	1,005	Continues, diminished
	Special Probation Caseload	843	Ended
ipal Court	Pre-trial Intervention	102	Continues, diminished
unty Corrections nter	Vocational Project	418	Continued SPA
	Vocational/Legal Project	268	Continued briefly SPA
	Women's Self Development	134	Continued briefly SPA
role Office	Parole Aides	74	Ended
y Departments	Supported Work (Rehabilitation)	639	Continues, Labor, SPA
	Drug Treatment (TASC)	568	Ended
	Street Lighting	107	Ended
mmunity Groups	Man to Man (Rehabilitation)	758	Ended
	Newark Prep "	631	Ended early
	Vindicate, "	627	Continued briefly, DYFS
	North Ward Youth (Prevention)	501	Continues, SPA & other
	Independence High School (Rehabilitation)	495	Continues, Labor, DYFS
	4-H (Rehabilitation)	425	Ended early
	Bergen Street Merchants	71	Ended
	Rutgers Juvenile Delinquency	38	Ended
yor's Office	Impact Planning Unit	1,199	Continues, diminished

urces: Jordan, Alan Zalkind, 10/20/80 and numerous interviews with agency personnel. (1975)

The explanation of terms for the status of the projects are:

Continues = Continues as of 1980 as a well-running project.
Continues diminished = Running as of 1980, but the project does not run well.
Continued briefly = The project ran for one or two years after Impact funding stopped.
Ended = Program ended immediately on the end of the Impact funds.
Ended early = A decision ended a mismanaged program while Impact was still runnir
Not started = The project was not started because the city could not make the cash match.

to do to reduce crime in the cities". (New York Times, 2/17/76, 1) While the Director gave little elaboration in print, three aspects that went awry will be described below. Briefly, they are: the struggles over the direction of the program and its coordination with other government agencies; the substance of the projects launched; and the abrupt termination of most projects with the end of the funding. The few projects which continue undiminished have had strong leadership, provide direct services, and received funding of around $500,000.

The struggles between the Mayor's office on one side, the New York regional office and the state planning agency on the other, are fully documented in the 1975 evaluation. (Jordan) At the outset, the regional office and the state planning agency advised Washington that Newark was a poor choice because the city had a record of difficulty in fiscal and program management of federal funds, the Mayor and Council were entangled in fierce political struggles, and, concerning LEAA specifically, the city had "rarely submitted grant applications which [the state planning agency] could approve. (Regional office memorandum 1/25/72 in Jordan: 10) The state planning agency hesitated three weeks before approving Gibson's selection of Earl Phillips to head the Impact program. It severely criticized his first plan and its revision and rejected the entire draft plan submitted in September on the grounds that it was skewed toward community projects, failed to involve operating agencies, and contained many technical deficiencies. After the failure of a top level meeting in Trenton to bring immediate changes in the work of the planning unit, the regional Director and the state planning agency Director met the Mayor on November 15 to inform him that Phillips would have to resign or the Impact project would be given to another city. Gibson capitulated and agreed that a state planning agency official would serve as interim Director. (Jordan) When a New York Daily News story from Washington predicted Phillips resignation, Mayor Gibson

resisted. Phillips, forced to resign six days later, accused LEAA of racism. (Star Ledger, 11/30/72, 12) Mayor Gibson did not acknowledge the validity of the charges that Phillips had failed to manage the program responsibly in the expenditure of funds and in project planning. In retrospect, he placed blame on Trenton's jealousy over the high salary paid the Impact project Director. (Jordan's taped interview with Gibson, 10/27/75)

The Newark experience of state domination was blatant in the Impact program but not unusual. The fact that Newark has less than 5% of the state's residents is basic to Newark's small influence in Trenton on all matters. In every state LEAA dollars reached cities via their respective state capitals. One big city mayor aptly characterized at a congressional hearing the cities' experience of hinderance from the state planning agencies.

> The state administered block grant system has encouraged states to second guess the professional judgment of city officials and to impose unreasonable conditions on federally funded projects. (Brown, 1971, 262)

During the crucial period of decisions on which projects to fund, the assistant director of the state planning agency ran the Newark's Impact program. His plan received Washington's approval in March, 1973, fourteen months after the program had been announced. When the Mayor named his appointee for Director, Hubert Williams, a black police sergeant with a background in community relations, the appointment was held up from February 22 until June 21, 1973 while the state planning agency satisfied itself that Williams could concurrently direct the program and carry a reduced course load in his last year at law school. (Jordan, 70-72) In May 1974, the Mayor appointed Williams as Police Director and elevated his deputy to Impact Director. The élan had gone out of the Newark program after Phillips' dismissal. (Jordan)

Concurrent with these conflicts over how to shape the program, the Newark Impact office made some overtures to coordinate with other federal programs focused on crime. Washington had designated the Department of Health Education and Welfare to develop juvenile delinquency projects within each Impact city, but talk never produced a workable plan in Newark, and eventually HEW withdrew its funds. (Jordan, 30-36 and 66-39) In fact, Newark developed no coordination between any federal program and Impact beyond absorbing into the Impact staff the three criminal justice planners who had been funded by the Model Cities Program.

The one anticipated conflict over Impact spending which did not take place was between Mayor and Council. The City Council acquiesced in the arrangement that the Impact program would be entirely directed out of the Mayor's office and that Council function would be limited to one member on the advisory board and the legislative power to approve each project. When Phillips was slow in preparing the plan and grants, a council member criticized him. (Star Ledger, "Harris warns crime project to start protecting citizens", 8/15/72) When the Mayor acquiesced in control of the Impact program by the state planning agency, Council members grumbled briefly and likewise acquiesced.

The second set of problems resided in the specified projects which Impact funded. They were a patchwork of what city and county wanted and what the state planning agency was willing to permit. Five of the twenty-seven projects cost over one million dollars and together consumed half the Impact budget. All but one of these was a police project. Additional personnel was the expense in

four of these five large projects. The Impact planning unit insisted that hiring under the Impact program had to fill new positions and could not simply be used to fill vacancies created by attrition. Consequently, the police department grew to the maximum size it had ever attained and set the stage for a massive layoff in 1975. When a city must spend money quickly on entrenched problems, it can purchase sophisticated equipment and hire more personnel. Both of these solutions are tacked on to the existing organization which has to change very little to accommodate them. When the funding ceases, the new equipment is not maintained and the personnel are fired. Some detail on the problems with the substance of the programs will be given later in the section on police.

Newark puts its own stamp on the national Impact program through projects sponsored by community groups. Although greatly reduced from the city's initial plan, community projects spent some $1,800,000, a larger share than average for Impact cities. (Chelimsky, 165) One of them, the North Ward Youth Community Project was judged by the Impact Director Zalkind to be the most successful project of all. The funds supported jobs, recreation and training for youth run by a broad purpose organization which had sprung up among Italians in the North Ward as the moderate alternative to Imperiale. The North Ward Educational and Cultural Center had blossomed into existence five years prior to the Impact program, was supported by other grants, and took the Impact funds to support any of its work which Impact guidelines could be stretched to cover. The youth project did not focus on offenders who had committed Impact crimes. It was made accpetable under Impact guidelines by the application phrasing that stressed crime prevention and recidivism prevention among the youths served. After the end of the Impact program the Center continued its work by creatively piecing together other grants.

The Newark experience shows that when organizations can distort national solutions to their local needs, local aims can be achieved. National aims can rarely be achieved in recipient cities which most need the assistance. The reason these cities desparately need the help is that they are trapped in a vicious circle of dwindling resources and poorly managed city government. Their history of poor management sets high probabilities that the next grant will also be poorly managed.

Termination of projects formed the third set of problems in the operation of Impact. The national objective "to institutionalize effective programs in the eight Impact cities" was honored in the breach in Newark. The city had had difficulty in coming up with the required 20% matching funds, shifting much of it from other federal grants. The deliberate design of spending quickly for a big impact left entirely to the city how it would proceed afterwards. Since Newark had been the slowest city in starting its projects, many were just beginning in 1975 when other cities were winding down. Since two million dollars in projects were scheduled to run past the final spending deadline of December 31, 1976, Newark successfully brought pressure on LEAA to extend the deadline. Newark's representative in Congress was Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. He and Mayor Gibson met with the acting Director of LEAA and other top officials. An unnamed official later recalled that Rodino threatened "If Newark is cut out, I would find it very difficult to support LEAA in my committee." (New York Times, 11/17/76, 1, and Star Ledger "Newark May Gain Time to Spend Crime Funds", 9/17/75 and Star Ledger, 2/18/76, 27)

Newark had less success in getting the state planning agency to commit new funds to continue projects. It considered an application to extend team policing but then refused on the reasonable grounds that Newark's plan to spread the benefits by rotating the team six months, contradicted the basis of team policing which is familiarity between officer and neighborhood residents. (Star

Ledger, 4/28/76 and Afro-American "Councilman James Hits Team Police Fund Cutoff") About one-third of the projects ended immediately, a few continued briefly with state funds, eight continue with diminished success and three projects continue to perform well. This record is poor when compared to other Impact cities. (Chelimski, 193-239)

In sum, the conflicts which were designed into the Impact program in Newark were instrumental to its failures. There were power struggles by the state planning agency and the LEAA regional office against the city. There were conflicts of principle. Selection of Newark on the criterion of need conflicted with selection of recipients on the basis of sound grant management. The city preference for a community based approach conflicted with the reliance on criminal justice agencies. The LEAA focus on reduction of street crimes conflicted with Newark's need for agency upgrading. And the most harmful conflict of all was the conflict between the desire for quick results and the long term nature of the problems.

Trenton's Initiatives: Foot Patrol

In January 1973 as Governor Cahill prepared to run for re-election, he promised the cities of New Jersey a program called Safe and Clean Neighborhoods. (New York Times, 1/17/73, 84:1) This form of urban aid enabled the cities to hire more police officers and sanitation men. The conditions of the program were that officers be especially hired for the program, that they patrol on foot and that the city pay 50% of their salaries. Newark was slow to start the program because Mayor Gibson was arguing that officers on overtime could fill the positions immediately, while recruiting would create delays. (Star Ledger, 7/22/73, 22:1) In a compromise, the department hired 28 new officers during 1974 and paid overtime to fill 44 positions.

(Budget Office, Newark Police Department, Safe Neighborhood Program, 1977)

Again, the city administration made a confluence decision in which solution did not fit the problem. The current consensus in the police field is that outside of high density business districts, walking officers are less capable of providing a range of service than officers in cars. Walking patrol has not been demonstrated effective in deterring street crimes. Newark sorely needed to place more officers on car patrol during the evening tour. However, members of the public yearned to see a police officer and nostalgically reflected on the old days of the officer on the beat. Newark had traditionally maintained a formidable police presence in the central business district with traffic officers on nearly every corner. Mayors across the state could not afford to refuse walking officers given the public's high levels of fear of crime and the sentimental attachment to the foot patrolman.

Problems Besetting the Police Department

The police department's responsibilities for coping with crime were engulfed in a tide of other problems, both carried over from the past and newly formed. Carried over from the days of Commission government were problems of corruption and excessive use of force, which, under Gibson, surfaced sporadically. Another carry over from the distant past was that the racial composition of the department seriously lagged the changing composition of the city. (Fisher) The new set of problems were tied to power struggles for control of the department. Collective bargaining began in 1971 with the union stripping management of considerable power. In contrast to Director Spina's enjoyment of eight years of total support from Mayor Addonizio and the City Council, Gibson's three Police Directors experienced serious opposition from the City Council, and the first Director had little support from the Mayor,

the second was fired without warning, and only the third had support. None of the three Police Directors were able to bring about comprehensive upgrading of the department. Under the first Director, police officers took sides in a bitter confrontation between Italian and black groups, under the second and third officers violently broke up peaceful citizen gatherings. The fact that the second and third Directors had not risen through the ranks and were black undercut the authority within the department. A different set of new problems arose from the fiscal crisis of the city which caused three waves of layoffs. The net effect of all these problems was that the police achieved little in alleviating crime problems and, far from providing a sense of safety, heightened people's fear of crime.

The new problems of union-management relations transformed relations between men of the police officer rank and department management. The history of Spina's capricious personnel decisions made members of the department eager to secure some rights against management through a contract. In 1968 lobbying led by the teachers' union and the state PBA won legislation setting up the Public Employees' Relations Commission, PERC. When PERC began operating in 1970, it conducted an election in the Newark department to select the bargaining unit. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, PBA, won against the Fraternal Order of Police, FOP. Since the city had no money, the PBA won contract language instead. Although PBA members at the time did not believe their leadership, they later recognized the power of veto the PBA leadership had in the Maintenance of Standards clause.

> All rights, privileges and benefits existing prior to this Agreement are retained with the following exceptions:
>
> 1. Those benefits abridged or modified by this Agreement or
> 2. Those changes in benefits which are not substantial and unreasonable.
>
> Elimination or modification of rights, privileges or benefits which are substantial and unreasonable shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure.

During the first four years of contracts, the PBA took about seventy-five cases to arbitration and won seventy-one, according to the tally kept by the PBA president. Under the Maintenance of Standards Clause the PBA successfully prevented management controls such as requiring officers who work inside jobs to punch time clocks and requiring all officers to file affidavits attesting to their police residence. , 10/27/72) A similar clause in the contract of the Superior Officers' Association (SOA) prevented management from changing the policy of providing superior officers unmarked cars to take home. The PBA kept secret its list of arbitrations won, treating them as akin to trade secrets. The city has had such a turnover of attorneys in the Corporation Counsel's office that the city did not have files of what it had won and lost through arbitration. Whenever the PBA filed a grievance it told the city that it had previous decisions pertinent to the case and the city did not know whether they existed or what they were. (Gasparinetti, 10/7/80) Coupled with the union's veto power was a mutual antagonism between union and management which often worked to thwart changes which would have improved the performance of the department. In 1978 when the FOP won the official bargaining election to represent the police officers, relations between management and labor declined to their not being on speaking terms.

The City Council worked to undercut the power of each of Gibson's Police Directors. They were not successful with John Redden, the first Director.

The fact that he was white caused great consternation among black councilmen and generally among Gibson's strongest supporters. Gibson later defended his selection on the grounds that police officers "would have crucified a black Director." (New York Times 7/25/71:VI,7)

Shortly after taking office, Redden transferred nearly two hundred members of the department in order to move honest and competent people into key positions. Individuals removed from choice assignments ran to the City Council which called Redden on the carpet. According to the recollections of a Redden supporter, the Police Director met the Council in closed session and listened while they vented their anger. Then he gave them a piece of his mind in this vein.

> I'm running the police department, and I don't owe you a thing because initially you voted nine to nothing not to appoint me. My six months' leave of absence from my position as deputy chief will be up soon. If you have the guts you can vote against me. As you know, I'm in this job because you voted for me. I would like to remind you that the people who held your seats before you were indicted, and hopefully they are going to jail. I just want you to think that over. I'm going back to my job.

Redden did not receive strong support from either the Mayor or the Council. He put priority on increasing police protection in the central business district, weeding out corrupt officers and upgrading management. (McCullen, 1971, 24) The department was sorely tired in its efforts to keep order during the protracted teachers' strike. In a prepared statement Redden warned the people that demagogic rhetoric and violent conduct at public meetings was being used to inflame people, as they had been in 1967. He painted an alternative future in which the city provided black young men as recruits to the department and the department worked to assure a reasonable degree of safety for those who lived, worked and visited the city. (Newark Evening News, "Time for Decision, Redden Warns City", 4/12/71)

A year and a half later Redden resigned over the Kawaida Towers issue.

Imamu Baraka sponsored the building of a high rise apartment and cultural center at the edge of the Italian community in the North Ward. The racial confrontation started long before the first construction crew began digging the foundations. When an integrated construction crew arrived to work a crowd of chanting demonstrators would not let them pass. The presence of 145 helmeted police officers could not clear the way for the construction workers. Some among the demonstrators were off-duty police officers, and the tactical unit which had primary responsiblity for maintaining order there was heavily composed of Italians. Redden condemned the decision to build Kawaida Towers as motivated by "narrow, selfish political ends." He resigned, declaring it had become "impossible to continue as a member of the administration". (Star Ledger, 12/2/72, 1)

The Council refused to confirm Gibson's second nominee for Police Director, Edward Kerr. Gibson had decided upon a black man as Director, but at least two of his choices declined. (Interview with an Inspector in the Newark Police Department) Kerr was a lieutenant in the Housing Authority Police, which had just been merged into the city department. In a humiliating series of meetings Gibson presented Kerr's nomination to the City Council, a majority rejected it, but permitted him a 90-day term as acting Director. Finally, seven months after his nomination, a majority of the Council voted to confirm him. Kerr served as Police Director slightly over a year, until after Gibson's re-election. Since Kerr, on his own initiative had reverted to his civil service rank of lieutenant in order to be eligible to take the captain's test, the Mayor simply appointed another man into the vacant Director's slot.

Hubert Williams was immediately confirmed by the City Council. He came from directing the Impact program while on leave as a sergeant in the department. He had earned both a bachelor's and a law degree. Williams had other problems with the City Council during his first four years as Director. The three police officers on leave who had won election to the City Council would demand management information from him and then openly pass it to the PBA leaders, thus undercutting him.

The City Council Reflex Response to Crime

At intervals throughout Gibson's first two terms the City Council threw itself into battle against street crime by voting to hire more officers. Council members heeded the cries of fearful constituents. At the meeting of December 15, 1971 the Council heard a frightening story of a young man who died in a pool of blood while his neighbors and family called the police again and again. After other members of the public and Councilmen had told their stories of terror, a strong majority voted to increase the department by two hundred officers provided that they be assigned to foot patrol. This same Council session refused to raise the pay of civilians in the department or of Director Redden, who had threatened to resign. (Star Ledger, 12/16/71, 26)

The number of officers did rise slightly each year from 1,444 in 1970 to the largest it had ever been in October 1974 at just over 1,600. The City Council's most sustained involvement in trying to keep the department fully manned began in 1975 with the struggle to avert layoffs, which will be discussed shortly.

Police Use of Impact Funds

The $7,500,000 spent directly by the Police Department during 1973-76 constituted a handsome addition to their operating budget of $21,000,000. An additional two million hired a force of 110 guards at the public housing projects. Table 9-9 in a previous section lists the police projects. A closer

look at the largest project illustrates some of the department's difficulty in dealing with crime problems.

The most expensive project was a new communications system which included a 911 emergency number, a counter measuring the volume of incoming calls, a six channel radio system, a computer aided dispatching system and a computer system for patrol. Newark did not have personnel with the expertise or the will to install and run the system efficiently. While the eighteen months period designated for installation was unrealistically short, the four years required were excessive.

A sophisticated system of the type Newark installed is premised on the assumption of well running patrol and communications divisions. Where that assumption is false, the new equipment makes old problems more prominent. Specifically, the first component, the 911 emergency number is designed to encourage the public to call the police. When the police operators were flooded with calls, the department solved that problem by installing a tape recorded message which the 911 operators could play. When an operator determined that a particular call was not an emergency, she hung up on the caller and pushed a button to play the recorded message. The caller thus learned that his call was not an emergency and that he could call the switchboard for non-emergency service. Since the switchboard operators were also overloaded with calls at peak periods, they failed to answer a great many calls. This failure even to listen to requests for service probably contributed substantially to the public's frustration with the police department.

The next component, a counter on the incoming telephone lines provides valuable management information about the volume and distribution of citizen calls for service. Where management makes flexible use of manpower, a counter provides continuous feedback on a daily basis of the fit between workload and communications manpower. However, in Newark management obtained monthly figures

which showed month after month that on the average department operators had failed to pick up the phone on 15% to 30% of the calls. Since management was not able to correct this continual shortcoming, it kept the figures secret.

The dispatching system was designed to stack calls on the basis of priority. With the breakdown of the component which feeds the signals from the car radio buttons into the computer, the system went down and was not repaired for a year. Workload analyses for patrol were never performed because the department did not acquire or prepare the necessary computer programs. The computer aided dispatching system was designed to provide a wide variety of information on time, place, type of incident, response time, and workload per car. This information was never put to systematic use and the department continued the traditional practice of assigning equal numbers of patrol cats to each tour. This allocation is so clearly illmatched to the twenty-four hour cycle of workload that a sophisticated computer system is not necessary to document the need for manpower reallocation.

In conclusion, the police communications system needed substantial improvement in 1972 and thus the decision to purchase new equipment was reasonable. Since federal funds were available and since Boeing and Motorola had the products, the department acquired a more sophisticated system than it could handle. Here is a recursive pattern within the Impact program. The city made a decision based on a confluence approach in which a nationally available solution distorted the assessment of local needs. The new technology represented in a 911 or kindred system works in organizations which confront and solve problems as soon as they arise. However, the history of the Newark department and of city government as a whole has been to ignore and hide problems when possible.

The four other large police projects were expensive because the funds paid for salaries. All four projects became caught up in the city's fiscal crisis and the layoffs of police officers. The two projects employing sworn personnel, forty-two man team policing unit and the forty-nine man tactical anti-crime unit, selected experienced officers from within the department and then filled their old slots with new recruits. The team policing project was like many others on the East Coast, a mini-department that provided direct police service to a single neighborhood. Both the police department and the Impact planning unit thought highly of the project since reported crimes went down in the team area. Impact funds expanded the tactical unit which had begun with federal funding in 1969. The anti-crime unit established a decoy squad and attracted some highly competent officers who made many good arrests.

The civilian programs employed directly a 137 man housing security force and about three hundred parttime auxiliary officers. Immediately prior to

the Impact funding, the fifty-two buildings run by the Newark Housing Authority had no separate security force. In September 1972, Governor Cahill had signed legislation which integrated the Housing Authority Police Force into the regular department. Police Director Redden had developed this plan which quickly expanded the department and brought in more black and Hispanic officers. (Star Ledger, "Governor fuses NHA cops with Newark regulars", 9/8/72) Back in 1964 Director Spina had made a similar move. When Impact paid for hiring new housing guards, they were designated as a ready manpower reserve for the Newark department. The hollowness of this promise became evident in 1975 with the layoffs of regular police officers. State funding carried the housing guards for a few years beyond the end of the Impact program, and then there were no more guards at housing projects.

The auxiliary police project got underway in March 1975 just as the city prepared to layoff regular officers. The three officers on the City Council sponsored the $94,000 appropriation as a matching grant. (Star Ledger, "Newark allocates funds for auxiliary cop patrols," 2/10/75) The PBA condemned this waste of funds at a time that regular employees were being laid off. The auxiliary police included political appointees who took personal advantage of their positions. (New York Times, 2/17/76, 10) The program was quickly terminated at the end of the grant. A particular consequence may be noted. Prior to Impact there were unpaid auxiliaries who directed traffic on special occasions and performed parade duty. The payment of $3 per hour to the new breed of auxiliaries, drove out the unpaid volunteers.

Police Layoffs

On January 4, 1975 Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson presided over a ceremony at which he sent forty-seven new recruits out to the street and gave promotions to twenty-five officers. (Star Ledger, 1/5/75) At that very time, it was evident that the city would have to take drastic measures to balance its budget. For two years running, Mayor Gibson had reduced the property tax rate and increased city employment, an accomplishment achieved largely through massive assistance from Washington and Trenton. (Yatrakis, 1980, ch. 5) The struggle focused around the Mayor's proposal to layoff 433 city workers, mostly in the Public Works and Health and Welfare Departments, to cut $17 million from the Board of Education budget, and to raise the property tax rate to $8.89 per $100 assessed evaluation. Futile efforts to avert the first mass layoff since the depression included consideration of furloughing city employees every fifth or tenth working day, cancelling scheduled increases in salaries and benefits, eliminating all city appropriations for the Board of Education, and making an even steeper increase in the property tax rate.

The crisis deepened in March: the budget deficit was discovered to be $35.7 million out of a budget of $250 million. The Mayor explained that due to recession, inflation, cutbacks in anticipated state aid to education, shrinking revenue sources, and the general rise in the cost of government, the layoffs would now have to include policemen and firemen. (Star Ledger, 3/14/75) On March 16th the Mayor's plan was described in the Star Ledger -- to layoff 130 policemen and 66 firemen and to demote 42 police officers and some firemen. If an additional $2 million could be found, these layoffs could be prevented.

The Mayor stood alone against an array of individuals and organizations which each sought to avert or reduce the layoffs. The Police Director Hubert Williams, neither defended the Mayor's cuts nor led the opposition to them.

The most prominent opponents of the layoffs were City Council members and the presidents of the two police unions, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Superior Officers' Association. The nine-men City Council had often had a police officer as member but in 1974 the unusual took place: the voters had elected three police officers to the Council.

The Presidents of the PBA and the SOA combed the budget to find money saving proposals to discuss with City Council members on March 18th.

1. Curtailment of overtime paid to policemen on Safe and Clean Streets program.....$324,767
2. Temporary layoff of school crossing guards.....$300,739
3. Not filling 26 currently vacant positions in the police department.....$239,359
4. Abolition of 4 police chaplain posts.....$ 21,976
5. Curtailment of overtime for varied assignments, including Council meetings,,parades, drug enforcement, data processing, auctions, and emergencies.....$190,000

Total $1,076,841

The Bronze Shields, the fraternal association of black police officers, made their own alternative proposals on the 20th. They suggested that the department should consider ending a variety of fringe benefits -- clothing allowances, gasoline for superior officers, extra holiday pay, and the pay differential between detectives and patrolmen. (Star Ledger, 3/21/75 and The Journal [Elizabeth], 3/21/75) However, the night of March 20th the City Council reluctantly accepted the Mayor's budget with a few amendments, leaving in the Mayor's hands the question of layoffs.

After final passage of the Mayor's $253 million budget on March 27th a new round began in the fight to save police officers. The PBA and SOA obtained a court injunction to make certain that the department did not spend funds on overtime for the Safe Streets program. (Star Ledger, 4/5/75) The department had been filling many of the Safe Street positions by hiring regular officers

on overtime, a day at a time. The PBA aimed to force the department to hire into Safe Street positions officers slated for layoff.

County Superior Court Judge Pat Thomas issued a restraining order prohibiting the Newark Police Department from requiring an officer to work overtime in a Safe Streets position. (Star Ledger, 4/5/75) Once the restraining order was granted, all officers followed their union's direction to remove their names from the lists of volunteers for the positions. Once there no longer were lists of volunteers, the issue became moot and the hearing was adjourned. The immediate effect of these maneuvers was to cut by 39 the number of officers on the street each day.

Not to be outdone, the Fraternal Order of Police made vehement accusations on the day the PBA won the court order. How can Police Director Williams permit layoffs to happen in view of the negative effect it will have on the city? Mayor Gibson is playing politics with the lives of the people of Newark! (Star Ledger, 4/5/75)

The Bronze Shields asked U.S. District Judge Curtis Meanor to hold a civil rights hearing on the impending layoffs. The Bronze Shields argued that the disproportionately small number of black and Hispanic officers would justify giving these minorities special consideration in planning the layoffs rather than simply using the Civil Service criterion of least seniority. The population of Newark had become 54% black and 12% Hispanic by 1970 but the proportions

of minorities in the rank of police officer in April 1975 were only 24% black and 2% Hispanic. (Newark Police Department, 1977) Minority group members were even rarer at higher levels. In support of their case the Bronze Shields pointed to the order which Judge Meanor had issued on October 8, 1974 requiring the police department to revise its hiring procedures so that one-third of all new recruits would be black or Hispanic. Their arguments were not persuasive. In deciding on April 28th to go along with the department's plan of laying off according to seniority, Judge Meanor stated that if he granted special consideration to minority members facing layoffs, it would be at the expense of white police officers who reasonably expected to keep their jobs.

As the layoff date drew near, the Newark Office of the State Civil Service Commission scrutinized the list of 111 officers who received layoff notices and disapproved 71 on the grounds that these individuals had veterans' status or more seniority than others who did not receive notice. (Star Ledger, 4/27/75) Civil Service officials pointed out that Civil Service regulations require that employees receive 45 days' notice, but that if the city reordered its lists immediately it could receive Civil Service approval to proceed with the layoffs as scheduled. (Star Ledger, 4/27/75)

The issue of demotions was also troublesome. The department has a flat salary schedule in which the top pay for sergeants is 11% more than top pay for police officers, and lieutenants make only 11% more than sergeants. (Kansas City Police Department, 1973 and Star Ledger, 5/13/75) However, the difference in pay between the top of the sergeants' scale and the bottom of the lieutenants' was only $408 a year. Thus, the proposal to demote 42 officers, ranging from 1 deputy chief to more than a dozen sergeants, probably would have generated enough saving to pay the wages of fewer than five officers. Rank has importance in police departments far beyond the dollar figures, however. The

hierarchial outlook which pervades a police department makes rank a very important attribute of an officer.

The State Civil Service Commission stepped into this controversy as well. It ruled that the city could not demote 15 lieutenants without first demoting the Police Director. A complicated seniority situation had arisen when Hubert Williams, then a sergeant, took a leave of absence to serve as Executive Director of the Newark Impact program. Williams still held the rank of sergeant when the Mayor appointed him Police Director. He subsequently received promotion to lieutenant, but of course did not receive a lieutenant's salary while serving as Police Director. Williams appealed their decision, but took his demotion on May 12th along with six other lieutenants and twelve sergeants. (Star Ledger, 5/13/75)

By Monday, April 28th, the city had squeezed enough funds to save the jobs of all but fifty-nine officers. (Star Ledger, 4/29/75) Director Williams stated that it was up to the PBA to make the next move. Key participants met on the night of Friday, May 2nd, the dismissal deadline, and carried their negotiations into the early hours of Saturday morning. The PBA President, Ronald Gasperinetti, and the SOA President, Joseph Rox, met with city representatives: Police Director Williams, Police Chief Anthony Barres, the city labor analyst, Albert Pannullo, and the city attorney for labor negotiations, Gerald Dorf. The union representatives would not agree to give up salary or benefits, and so the dismissals took place. (Star Ledger, 5/4/75, Rox, 9/26/80 and Gasperinetti, 10/7/80)

Those dismissed were the young, energetic officers who in every department account for a disporportionately large share of the arrests and other easily measurable police tasks. Police Director Williams transferred twenty-three officers from administrative duties to the street and disbanded the twenty-one man Bureau of Investigation, which specializes in vice and gambling. Williams

explained that combatting street crime was the highest priority. "It's impossible to adequately cover all aspects of crime in the city while under severe financial stress." (Star Ledger, 5/4/75) In the aftermath Mayor Gibson made a brave front, calling police protection "better than ever". (Star Ledger, 6/20/75)

The City Council held a special meeting at the PBA's request on June 19th to consider passing a resolution authorizing emergency funding to rehire the fifty-eight officers. (Star Ledger, 6/20/75) The Mayor, who had no veto power over appropriations, threatened to ask the State Division of Local Government Services to reject such an appropriation. The PBA threatened to mount a demonstration calling for dismissal of the 135 crossing guards if the City Council did not pass the emergency appropriation. On June 25th about five hundred police officers from Newark and surrounding communities picketed at City Hall demanding the reinstatement of the laid-off officers. (Star Ledger, 6/26/75) The City Council appropriated no new funds.

The PBA continued to put pressure on the city to rehire the dismissed officers by directing its members to refuse overtime work. The city obtained a permanent injunction from County Court Judge Irwin Kimmelman that the Police Director had authority to decide that a situation was an emergency and that officers could not refuse to work overtime in an emergency. (Star Ledger, 7/9/75 and Rox, 9/26/80)

The union leadership then sought to cushion the blow to laid off patrolmen by arranging for them to work tours which otherwise would have been covered by officers on overtime. The SOA president had come up with the idea that officers could work a goodly number of tours and thus have some income while waiting for attrition to shrink the department to the point where they could be rehired. The first occasion for bringing the young officers back for a tour was the Puerto Rican Day parade on July 27th. The Police Department and the State

Civil Service Commission accepted the proposal and the Department issued guns and badges for the day. However, the plan failed because officers must be in the pension fund when they work, and laid-off officers could not get back into the pension fund unless they worked thirty days.

On October 7th the Fraternal Order of Police brought a civil suit against the City of Newark and Mayor Gibson in an attempt to undo the dismissals and demotions. The suit sought to compel the department to rehire all officers who had been laid off, to reinstate all demoted officials, to re-establish the disbanded units, and to cease using auxiliary police officers to answer minor calls for service. (The Journal [Elizabeth] 10/8/75) One may suppose that the FOP did not have as much hope of winning the lawsuit as they had of winning the confidence of the police officers in their campaign to replace the PBA as the bargaining agent for the rank and file. Meanwhile the PBA had succeeded in getting the city to rehire eight officers on July 14th to fill positions opened through attrition. By October the city had rehired ten more officers. (The Journal [Elizabeth], 10/8/75)

This protracted episode of the 1975 layoffs may be considered as ending on December 14th when Mayor Gibson announced that layoff notices would be sent to 115 firemen, 92 police officers, and 149 civilians in the police department. (New York Times, 12/15/75, 67:1 and Star Ledger, 1/30/76, 1)

The 1976 layoffs hit swiftly and the City Council moved swiftly to restore the shorn members. This second round of layoffs caused considerably less disruption to the department and anguish to the individuals involved than the first had. First, the unions had exhausted legal remedies in 1975, thus painfully learning the authority of the Mayor to order layoffs. The city on its side, no longer held false hopes that the union would give up contractually guaranteed benefits. Thus, on February 3rd, forty-five days after the dismissal notices went out, 92 police officers, 128 school crossing guards and 21 court attendant

were dismissed. (Star Ledger, 1/30/76, 1) Second, the City Council quickly forced Gibson to patch together enough federal and state funds to rehire most of the personnel. The Council had withheld approval of the city's renewal of the Housing and Community Development Act grant of $20.5 million until the Mayor agreed to rehire all officers using a variety of funds including $600,000 from the Housing grant, all of a $250,000 grant from the state planning agency and $300,000 from Title X of the Congressional Jobs Act. (Star Ledger, 4/11/76, 17) By mid-March 55 officers had returned to work and CETA funds had rehired all the crossing guards. (3/4/76 "Grant allow recall of 20 cops" and Information, "Back on the corner", 4/76) By July, there were only 29 officers still seeking to return from the 92 laid off in 1976 and the 37 who were still out from the 1975 layoffs when the second wave hit. In March 1977 another grant from the state planning agency funded the rehiring of the last of the officers from the 1975 layoffs. (Star Ledger "Newark cops to be rehired", 3/9/77)

Since the resolution the layoffs occurred quickly and quietly among the unions, the City Council, and the Mayor, only some of the deep rooted rancor surfaced. The tires of some police cars were slashed. (Star Ledger 11/18/78, 3) On the eve of the layoffs the PBA President had given Newark residents this irresponsible advice. (Star Ledger "East Ward protest urged over layoffs of 92 police", 1/29/76)

> "If you can't depend on your senior city officials to protect you and your family, if they are going to continue laying off the men whose job it is to protect you, then you should go and apply for a firearms permit," Gasparinetti said.

In a manifestation of the lingering bitterness was a linking of murder to the cutbacks in personnel. In December 1976 a letter to the editor from a sergeant who worked in recruiting maintained that a young man on the waiting list for appointment might not have been murdered as a taxi driver if the department had maintained its authorized strength. (Star Ledger "Cutbacks

blamed in death", 12/5/76)

The City Council members who were police officers on leave continued vigilance against further layoffs and even looked for opportunities to recruit. The Mayor had scheduled a third round of layoffs for the end of 1976 affecting 35 officers. The threat was not ominous because Councilman Martinez quickly announced that new federal funding under the Public Works and Local Assistance Act would avert the layoffs. (Star Ledger "Newark cops to keep jobs", 11/24/76) Once the last of the dismissal officers had been rehired, the Council pressed for new recruits. In July 1977 it appropriated funds for 28 positions. The department was on the verge of entering 41 recruits into the academy in September when the Mayor called a halt. (Star Ledger "Aides join efforts to retain cops", 9/22/77) So eager was the Council for more officers that it considered finding funds for 1977 by cutting from 1978 summer employment, recreation and either the St. Patrick's Day or the Columbus Day parade. (Star Ledger, 9/29/77, 30) Thus, at every opportunity, the City Council pressed against the City's fiscal resources to employ more officers from one moment to the next.

After the third wave of layoffs had been averted in November 1976 and the last officer reinstated the next in March, there was a fifteen months' silence on fiscal problems and layoffs. The dire fiscal straits which had been papered over before the 1978 election showed up in the preparation of the 1979 budget, just as they had in 1975. Again, a major element in the Mayor's balanced budget was massive police layoffs. The unhappy memories of the 1975 struggle haunted both sides in the 1978 confrontation. Moreover, both sides had become more antagonistic to the other. In February 1978 the Fraternal Order of Police, which had continually challenged the PBA as bargaining agent, won representation election. (Star Ledger "FOP defeats PBA in Newark bargaining rights election", 2/11/78) After the defeat, the PBA represented

only civilians in the department. As the new winner, the FOP had need to prove itself militant and aggressive in guarding the interests of the membership. In July while visiting Atlanta, Mayor Gibson had made some unguarded remarks when asked what he would do if faced with a tax revolt similar to California's proposition 13.

> I'd cut the police department in half if I could get away with it. But they'd run me out of town. The police would lobby and get the money back. (Star Ledger, 7/19/78, 1)

> [The Star Ledger continued, reporting the Mayor's Atlanta comments.] He also said he believed the public has been sold "a bill of goods" that the more police a city has, the lower the crime rate.
>
> "The number of murders in high-crime areas would not change a fraction of a per cent even if there were "15 patrolmen per block," he said.
>
> "In Washington, for example, 1,000 extra police officers were hired not so long ago. And it hasn't made any difference in the rate of crime. But the public still believes the more cops you have, the less crime there will be."

Gibson tried to soften his words when they appeared in the Star Ledger by stressing that he had been speaking hypothetically and had no intention of eliminating more jobs. (Star Ledger, 7/19/78, 16) Unmolified, the FOP President challenged Gibson to deny the fact that during the last year there were as many as 57,000 calls which went unanswered because of manpower cutbacks. He called on Gibson to apologize to "each and every police officer in this city." (Star Ledger, 7/16/78, 16)

> I can't understand how he (Gibson) could make such rash and irresponsible statements...Mayor Gibson needs twice the number of police officers that he has in the city...As it is now...no women or child is safe in this city. The Mayor wants everyone to believe crime has dropped in Newark. He claims that break and entries have declined. Why doesn't he open his eyes and look around? There's nothing left to break into.

In fact, the patrol division and the communications personnel were overwhelmed with calls for service during 1978. More than 10% of the telephone calls rang unanswered. The dispatchers sent cars on some 20,000 jobs a month but each month they received more than 2,000 repeat calls from citizens

who were waiting for a patrol car. Worse, the number of calls where a car should have been dispatched but none ever came had averaged 500 a month in 1977, but began January 1978 with 1,000 and averaged 3,000 a month through the end of August. (Central Communications Records for 1978) To meet this staggering workload Police Director Williams transferred sixty officers into patrol in mid-September. He took them from the decoy and tactical units, reducing them from one hundred men to forty. (Star Ledger "Newark to put 60 more cops on beat", 9/15/78) His decision to strip units which members of the department regarded as providing choice assignments and respected as the most productive gave rise to widespread anger throughout the department.

On October 13th, the FOP mounted a campaign with picketing in front of City Hall and leafleting to dramatize the need for more officers on the street and in the radio room. By then operators were missing more than 20% of the telephone calls. Almost all the superior officers from deputy chief down joined the demonstration to show their solidarity with the men over the shortage of personnel in the radio room. Two weeks later the FOP wrote the Mayor that he should demand the Police Director's immediate resignation. (Star Ledger, 10/27/78, 29)

Meanwhile, Newark's deep dependency on federal funds caused a crisis when Congress failed to renew the antirecession legislation which the city had counted on for $10,000,000. (Star Ledger, 11/23/78, 40) A recent state law prevented local governments and school boards from raising their taxes more than 5% above the level of the previous year. Since the city had lowered its tax rate by 10% over the last two previous years in the typical pre-election phase of the cycle, raising property taxes to the limit would not provide sufficient funds. The city had no recourse but layoffs. Since the police department had 1,453 officers, down only 150 from its maximum before the first layoff, Mayor Gibson chose to send layoff notices to 200 police officers out of the 450 city employees to be dismissed. The individuals scheduled

for termination were the same ones who had suffered in 1975 and 1976. They were individuals who had been hired when the Impact grant expanded the department by 92 officers. They were 28 individuals whom the state had forced the city to hire in 1974 under the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods grant. Only this final wave of layoffs reached into the department past the officers hired through grant funds.

'Fear City' Campaign

Under a newly elected president, Tom Possumato, the Fraternal Order of Police met 600 strong the night of November 16 in the auditorium of a Catholic church in Vailsburg and vowed to take all legal action necessary to thwart the layoffs. The meeting endorsed a campaign to strike fear into everyone who lived in or entered the city. The message was that crime was already such an omnipresent threat that layoffs would make everyone totally unsafe. This Fear City campaign expressed the utter frustration which many officers felt.

Another expression occurred at 3:00 a.m. the night of the FOP meeting when the windows were smashed of 38 police cars parked in a department lot at the east precinct and of 8 unmarked police vehicles parked among the private cars of postal workers at the lot next to police headquarters. (Star Ledger, 11/18/78, 3) The PBA President bluntly asserted that if police officers were responsible, "they did it for good reason". (Star Ledger, 11/19/78, 9)

> If that is the only way they can alert the public to our problem,...then it is a necessary evil...The damaging of equipment...is the last in a long series of attempts to try to tell the public that not only are they discouraged about the layoffs, but they are adamantly opposed to the present director of police.

which would permit police and fire personnel to retire at half pay after twenty years, down from the current twenty-five. (Interview, 10/7/80) The bill had been blocked in the 1977 legislature but came close to passing in 1978, when it might have encouraged enough senior officers to retire to save the 200 officers slated for layoffs. The Newark FOP and SOA leaders did not join the lobby for this costly legislation. Their premise was that the administration had chosen to decimate the police budget because such cuts are most likely to bring a public outcry and thus force legislative relief. They clung to vague and false hopes that the City Council had the authority to declare a state of emergency and thus circumvent the state imposed spending limits or that the state legislature would change those limits. (Star Ledger 11/21/78, 1) In contrast to their vagueness on the form of legislative relief, the local union leaders were very clear on how to arouse a public outcry. The Fear City campaign was their tactic. Despite the city Budget Director and the Corporation Counsel explanations that the city had no legal basis for increasing spending, the unions continued their Fear City campaign.

The first phase of the Fear City campaign was leafleting which began downtown the morning after the FOP membership meeting. Four different circulars bore similar frightening messages and identified the FOP local as the author. (From the broadside files, New Jersey Room, Newark Public Library and Afro-American, 11/25/78, 2)

IF YOU MUST ENTER-NEWARK
- . If you must walk; walk fast.
- . Do not walk alone.
- . Avoid isolated areas.
- . Keep car doors locked.
- . Avoid strangers.
- . Leave city before dark.
- . If attacked; scream loud.

Newark Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 12

STAY SAFE! KEEP OUT OF NEWARK!

***

AFRAID TO WALK IN OUR "FEAR CITY"?

GIVE MAYOR GIBSON [733-6400] A RING!

Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12

***

WELCOME TO NEWARK: CRIME CAPITAL OF NEW JERSEY

#1 in
- Murder
- Rape
- Robbery
- Burglary
- Auto Theft

"HAVE A NICE DAY!"

Fraternal Order of Police

***

CAUTION: You are in the "CITY OF FEAR"

NEWARK, N.J.;
due to inadequate police manpower...

"SHOP at your own

RISK!"

***

The first phase of the Fear City campaign rose to a climax on December 3rd when a motorcade of sixty cars and a sound van toured the city. The posters on the cars held Mayor Gibson and Police Director Williams responsible for the impending layoffs and repeated messages from the leaflets. Thereafter officers continued picketing on a small scale. (Star Ledger "Newark cops 'drive' against layoff plan", 12/4/78) Mayor Gibson's prediction in Atlanta proved correct, that the police would get the money restored through lobbying. On December 29th, the City Council voted to add an extra million dollars to the first quarter budget so that the Mayor could retain the officers for the next three months. (Star Ledger "Council votes funds to delay 200 cop furloughs", 12/29/78)

Because the first leafleting occurred immediately after the vandalism to the police cars, the two acts were in competition for attention. Vandalism won handily, receiving all the condemnation from officials except from the Mayor and the Police Director who condemned both. No statements to the press from police officers or superior officers have been found criticizing the Fear City campaign. The damage to the police cars can be understood as a rampage carried out one night by a very few officers and covered up by a few more. The Fear City campaign was deliberate union policy carried out in daylight week after week by over one hundred officers. In both cases individuals were acting directly contrary to their duty as officers. In the vandalism officers broke the law. In the fear campaign they worked directly against the goal of creating and maintaining people's sense of safety and security and directly against public confidence in the department itself.

The layoffs occurred as scheduled on January 1, 1979 because the Council had authority only to provide the funds and could not force Mayor Gibson to spend them. The direct consequence of the layoffs was to strip the department of all younger officers, those hired since 1972. The department was down to 1197 sworn officers. This staffing at 3.8 officers per 1,000 residents was down markedly from the 1974 peak of 1,603 officers and 4.7 per 1,000 residents. However, the three cutbacks did not drop the Newark staffing to the average for large cities, which was 3.4 per 1,000. (FBI, 1978, 231)

The concurrent demotions were accepted as in 1975, as an automatic consequence of the layoffs. In an avalanche, two deputy chiefs were demoted to inspector, two inspectors fell to captain, three captains dropped to lieutenant, 27 lieutenants tumbled to sergeant and 57 sergeants descended to police officer. (Star Ledger, 1/2/79, 3) The damage done, the FOP President vowed to continue the "fear city" campaign. He pointed with what may be regarded as perverse pride to the 22 rape cases reported in the first two weeks of January, double the number from the year before and to a 52.7% increase

in burglary and robbery. He asserted to the reporter, "We're going to tell the people that crime is on the rise." (Star Ledger, 1/19/79)

As a coda, one might look ahead to 1979 to the startling rise of recorded robberies from 3,682 in 1978 to 6,100 and the rise of auto theft from 5, 992 to 10,676. Officers of the Newark police department lived up to the words of their union president by recording unprecedented volumes of street crimes.