



STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMORY DRIVE, P. O. BOX 979  
TRENTON, N. J. 08625

C-20  
10/20/67 DA

22 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Newark, N.J., Period 14 thru 17 July 1967

TO: Chief,  
National Guard Bureau  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1

1. The Chief of Staff, Major General James F. Cantwell, received a telephone call at the Camp Grounds, Sea Girt, New Jersey from Governor Hughes, 140255 July 1967. The Governor stated that a riot was occurring in Newark, New Jersey, that he had ordered in the State Police, and directed General Cantwell to order the National Guard to duty in accordance with prearranged plans.

2. To provide adequate and immediate direct support to the State Police, three brigade headquarters and headquarters companies, four infantry battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, one artillery battalion and one MP company were ordered mobilized at home stations, effective 140330 July 1967. Criteria for selection of units was battalion strengths, mobility, location and retaining an available reserve of unmobilized NJARNG forces for employment in any of several other potential trouble areas in the State.

3. General Cantwell and Colonel W.R. Sharp, (Director, Operations and Training, Department of Defense,) departed Sea Girt by aircraft via Newark Airport and State Police pickup, arrived at pre-planned Command Post, Cavalry Armory, Roseville Avenue, Newark, New Jersey, at 0430 hours. Other needed personnel present at Sea Girt departed for Newark by sedan. Superintendent of State Police was present at Command Post and Governor Hughes arrived approximately 0500 hours.

4. A daylight (140730 July) area reconnaissance by the Governor, The Chief of Staff, DOD, N.J., the Superintendent, N.J. State Police, the Mayor of Newark, accompanied by principal staff members and senior executives of the City and County, showed the trouble zone consisted of an area 36 blocks by 24 blocks extending from the Newark City line on the west to High Street and Elizabeth Avenue on the east and from Central Avenue on the north to Lyons Avenue on the South, with the greatest volume of disorder centered along three principal east-west through streets - South Orange Avenue, Springfield Avenue and Clinton Ave. (See map - Incl 1).

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5. Following the reconnaissance, the command group (The Governor, The Chief of Staff DOD NJ, The Superintendent NJ State Police) in coordination with city police and civil authorities decided on the following operational plan:

a. Seal off the trouble area by employing NJARNG to establish road blocks at each street intersection of the perimeter; permit free entrance and exit to pedestrians; deny entrance to vehicular traffic except for bonafide area residents and employees of essential industry and services in the area; vehicular entrance permitted at 19 selected identification check points (see map Incl 1) on the perimeter manned by Newark Policemen familiar with the area; vehicles to be searched on entering. This required 137 road blocks and check points. Road blocks to be posted by a minimum of three (3) Guardsmen and check points manned by at least one (1) Policeman and two (2) Guardsmen.

b. Establish NJARNG dismounted patrols of one squad (10 to 12 men per squad) per block on Clinton Ave. and Springfield Ave. from the intersection of South 10th Street east to High Street on each of the two avenues to protect private property from further loss or damage. (See map Incl 1). This required 39 Squads.

c. Establish on each of Clinton Ave. and Springfield Ave. two (2) twenty five (25) man NJARNG motorized patrols to provide mobile support forces for the dismounted patrols in 4b above. The motorized patrols were to move along the street covering each from the west city line east to High Street. (See map Incl).

d. Establish and employ joint NJ State Police - NJARNG motorized patrols to patrol the perimeters of seven sectors (See map Incl 1). Patrol consist:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
1 State Police Sedan	3 State Trooper 1 Newark Policeman (Guide)
1 1/4 ton 4X4	3 EM NJARNG
1 2½ Ton 6X6 (to transport prisoners)	2 EM NJARNG 2 State Troopers (Arrest team)
1 State Police Sedan	2 State Troopers 1 EM NJARNG

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Two patrols per sector boundary. Direction of patrol movement to alternate in adjacent sectors. Patrols provide support to dismounted street patrols and road blocks in sector and to move to trouble spots within sector on order. (See map Incl 1).

e. Retain small, mobile reserve in each brigade task force and NJ State Police for emergency employment.

6. The trouble area was divided into two sub areas with Bergen Street running north to south as the sub area boundary.

7. HHC 2d Bde, 50th Armd Div with 5/117 Cav and 2/112 Arty attached was assigned the West Sub Area to execute tasks 4a, b, d and e above, and HHC 3d Bde, 50th Armd Div with 1/113 Inf and 2/113 Inf attached was assigned the same tasks in East Sub Area. 50th MP Co was assigned task 4c above in direct support of each brigade in sub area concerned.

8. Mobilized units (-HHC 1st Bde, 1/114 Inf, 2/114 Inf) moved from home stations and closed in assembly areas in Newark and East Orange by 141000 July, and were generally in place and executing missions by 141200 July.

9. Movement to assigned positions was slowed by dense traffic jams on east-west and north-south through streets caused by debris littered streets, curiosity seekers and normal through traffic. This was effectively reduced by execution of assigned tasks.

10. HHC 1st Bde with 1/114 Inf and 2/114 Inf was ordered to move from home stations in southern New Jersey to assembly areas in Westfield and West Orange; to complete the move and be prepared for employment in the Newark Area by 141730 July. This was accomplished without incident.

11. The operation achieved its purpose of ending looting, burning and other disorders generally by nightfall. However, during the night of Friday-Saturday, 14-15 July, Guardsmen, State Troopers, Newark Policemen and Firemen and citizens were subjected to numerous attacks by snipers in the areas along Clinton Avenue and Springfield Avenue, Bergen Street, Belmont Avenue and several other widely scattered areas of the city. The fire was delivered from apartments and roof tops of high-rise public housing apartments and other vantage points. It was brief in time length and deliberately or otherwise inaccurate. Choice targets of attack were firehouses, fire-fighting equipment, police stations, the city hospital, police cars and mobile patrol vehicles. Searches of areas from which snipers operated indicated the snipers were probably relatively few in numbers and moved away quickly when fire was returned and resumed operations from a new location - a guerrilla type activity carried on in the midst of a relatively friendly population. Sniping continued into the daylight hours of Saturday, 15 July.

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12. At 150001 July an Engineer Bn, an Armor Bn, and an Artillery Bn were directed to mobilize at home stations and prepare for employment in the Newark area. These units were moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of Newark closing in by 150500 July.

13. The 2d and 3d Brigades were relieved in place by the 1st Bde with 1/114 Inf, 2/114 Inf (-), 2/50 Armor, 3/112 Arty, and the 104th Engr Bn attached effective 160600 July.

14. In addition to the tasks set forth in par 4 above, NJARNG forces supported Newark civil authorities in providing security details for fire fighting equipment, public utilities repair equipment, fire houses and mobile fire equipment, an improvised auxiliary county jail, the city hospital, warehouses of foodstuff, liquor, medicines including drugs and supermarkets not yet molested; a water reservoir and in putting down numerous small attempts at looting in widely scattered locations throughout the city.

15. Information of the situation and knowledge of the area gained during operations and the stabilization of the situation by Sunday morning permitted the establishment of permanent areas of responsibilities to commands, standarization of patrols and provision for more responsive mobile reserves within each area. This system insured continuity of all operations and more effective command supervision of and within sub area and sector levels. This plan was implemented by 1700 hours Sunday 16 July to remain effective for the duration of the emergency.

16. The operations during the night of Saturday-Sunday repeated those of the preceding night, with an added mission of organizing rooftop details of one State Trooper and four selected National Guard riflemen to be emplaced on selected rooftops commanding the areas from which the most frequent sniper fire had been received. These numbered fourteen (14) positions shown on map, Incl 1. In response to indications of probable attempts at disturbances in the quiet northern sector of Newark, the New Jersey State Police organized roving patrols of the area and the 3d Bde employed a motorized patrol of Broadway from Bloomfield Avenue on the south to the Newark City line on the north. (See map Incl 1.) Broadway is a shopping area.

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17. Disturbances and sniper fire decreased markedly on Saturday-Sunday night and further on Sunday-Monday night to the point where on Monday it was the opinion of the Governor that the State Police and the NJARNG were no longer required to support the civil authorities in Newark. All engaged troops were withdrawn except the 50th MP Company, and had returned to home stations by 172230 July 67. Elements of the 102d Cavalry Regiment Headquarters and one Squadron stationed in Essex County were ordered to active duty at West Orange to discharge additional missions as they might arise in Newark, Plainfield and other threatening areas. The 50th MP Company was dispatched to Plainfield for immediate support of the New Jersey State Police in that area.

18. Of significant value in controlling the activities of the disturbing elements in the City of Newark was the proclamation and curfew order issued by the Governor of New Jersey on 14 July. This action closed all places dealing in alcoholic beverages, prohibited movement of vehicular traffic during the hours of 2200 and 0600; prohibited civilians being on the streets between 2300 and 0600; prohibited possession of alcoholic beverages, narcotics, fire arms or explosives of any kind, and ordered the State Police and NJARNG to take any and all measures to quell disturbances and outbreaks of violence, to secure areas within the City of Newark and generally to take all actions necessary to implement and effectuate his regulations.

19. Lessons learned in this operation:

a. While great reliance must be made on local civil authorities for initial intelligence, knowledge of the existing situation, information of the area, guides for movement into and about the area, requests for specific types of support and close coordination of operational activities; these are not always readily available and their unavailability serves as a serious obstacle to rapid formulation and implementation of plans.

b. Although the DOD-NJ and NJARNG commanders had established close personal and professional relationships with commanders and staff personnel of the New Jersey State Police over a period of two years preceding this operation, and plans had been jointly prepared for use of the NJARNG in direct support of the State Police, the execution of plans was delayed by a reluctance of local authority to recognize the full extent of the difficulty until damage had been done over a wide area and the difficulty encountered in getting intelligence quickly from local authorities already heavily committed. Future planning must emphasize the necessity for local authorities providing supporting forces with prompt intelligence.

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c. The community being aided, and adjoining communities with similar problems, become anxious at such times and attempt to overcome deficiencies in equipment required in this type emergency (gas masks, rifles, carbines, armored vests, ammunition, radios, vehicles, etc.) They solicit aid from a wide variety of federal agencies all of which are usually replied to by referring the requestor to The Chief of Staff, Department of Defense-NJ. Sometimes the ambitious person works from this channel and higher governmental echelons at the same time. This adds to the general confusion. It is suggested that efforts be made to advise community civilian officials that their requests for support will achieve a more rapid response if they are addressed initially to The Chief of Staff (The Adjutant General) for evaluation, and subsequent appropriate channeling. This will place all requests in one channel to be made to the federal agencies from one source. Further, it is urged that communities be encouraged to evaluate their equipment status for public safety operations in a civil disturbance environment involving guerrilla-sniper tactics, and where required, take early action to remedy deficiencies disclosed.

d. The early issuance of strong unmistakable proclamations of emergencies and compatible orders by civil authorities restricting sales of alcoholic beverages, weapons, ammunition, movement of vehicles and persons and cloaking law enforcement agencies with ample power to deal with lawless acts and violations of emergency regulations is an effective weapon in controlling and terminating widespread acts of violence and disorder.

e. The use of guerrilla sniper tactics in widespread civil disturbances requires the development of new techniques for employment against these agents in our cities. The sniper tactic employs an insignificant number of persons to harrass and jeopardize the welfare and physical and personal security of a preponderance of the local law abiding citizenry. The operation reported herein differed from any covered by existing military publications in that there were no large crowds to be dealt with, there was no discernable leadership to be apprehended and denied a mob. Acts of lawlessness and disorder were committed over wide areas by relatively small groups. The lawless pick their time and place, and the sniper does his damage. He then slips away in the dark or loses himself amidst the populace to employ his tactic at another opportune time and place. This requires coverage of large general areas and extra security for known selected targets. It also results in an apparent overcommitting of forces in combating him or denying to him his objective of disrupting public safety and public service agencies. The presence of mass military and police power apparently deterred resumption of mass crowd actions.

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f. Dispersal of forces over wide areas in small increments (squads, fire teams, fire apparatus security details) emphasizes the need for additional training of small unit leaders.

g. Saturation of the whole of the trouble area with a strong force of State Police and military units was effective in ending looting, burning and disorders other than sniper fire after dark. This was true to the extent that the support forces possibly could have been withdrawn from Newark at least one day earlier than they were.

h. Foot patrols in extended, heavily populated areas must be closely supported by strong, highly mobile, rapidly responsive reserve forces to preclude the foot patrol from becoming engulfed and lost in any sudden localized mob action. The mobile reserve force must move throughout the area constantly. Its very presence is a deterrent to reviving mob activity.

i. The presence of and/or the introduction of the armored personnel carrier (weapons unloaded) in mobile reserve forces and in localized minor disturbances proved to be a strong deterrent to disorder. The vehicle was also found useful against snipers. Upon its arrival, snipers fled. It was used effectively in delivering relief forces to beleaguered fire houses and searchers to buildings believed to house snipers.

## SECTION 2 - Commanders Observations.


20. Training and Organizations. The type civil disturbance experience reported on here indicates training deficiency only in anti-sniper activity in multiple areas of friendly cities and smallest unit command, and control in independent actions in large domestic population centers.

21. A solution to the multi-sniper fire problem may be to employ only trained anti-sniper forces to act against them whenever possible. These teams should be divided into two employment categories: mobile teams operating in SP mobile carriers with highly responsive communications equipment, and stationary teams operating from command positions on rooftops or other vantage points in known or likely sniper activity areas. Anti-sniper teams should be equipped with fire observation optical equipment, and be trained in target detection identification and destruction. Equipment should provide day and night capability. None of the foregoing should preclude the average soldier from defending himself against sniper attack if he returns the fire on identified hostile targets. Finding a sniper hidden among friends in a multi block size fifteen story apartment house containing hundreds of separate apartments is a monumental task at best.

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22. Development of small unit leadership requires opportunity to exercise doctrine and principles. The small unit leadership in this operation improved with time.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:



SAMUEL F. BRINK  
Colonel, NJANG  
Adjutant General

- 2 Incl  
1. Map  
2. Personnel, Unit  
Strength Summary



UNIT-PERSONNEL SUMMARY  
NEWARK-14-17 JULY 1967

UNIT*	HOME STATION	ASGD (-REP)	STRENGTHS			
			14	15	16	17
HHC 1st Bde (Part)	Cherry Hill	102	43	43	47	61
HHC 2nd Bde	Orange	102	96	96	96	97
HHC 3d Bde	Paterson	112	99	102	103	104
50 MP Co	Passaic	157	142	146	146	147
2/112 Arty	E. Orange	325	276	282	292	300
1/113 Inf	Jersey City	591	510	555	588	590
2/113 Inf	(Passaic)	610	592	593	602	614
	(Paterson)					
	(Teaneck)					
	(Dimont)					
1/114 Inf	(Woodbury)	642	570	587	590	599
	(Salem)					
	(Pitman)					
	(Mount Holly)					
2/114 Inf	(Cherry Hill)	626	588	630	632	633
	(Burlington)					
	(Bordentown)					
5/117 Cav	(Westfield)	582	548	556	574	575
	(Elizabeth)					
2/50 Armor	(Red Bank)	357	-	286	315	350
	(Toms River)					
104 Engr Bn	Teaneck	729	-	522	608	656
3/112 Arty	(Morristown)	319	-	338	341	343
	(Somerville)					
HHT 102 Cav (Part)	West Orange)	52	-	-	-	13
1/102 Cav	Newark	372	-	-	-	285
<b>TOTALS</b>						
14 July		3849	3464			
15 July		5254	-	4736		
16 July		5254	-	-	4934	
17 July		5678	-	-	-	5367
			90%	90%	93%	94%

\*All units except those of 102 Armd Cav Regt are components of 50th Armd Div.

Incl 2 to ltr DOD NJ Subj: "Operational Report-Newark, NJ, 14-17 July 1967"  
dtd 22 August 1967